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RICE l\I. YOUELL, SUPER.INTE·NDENT OF THE STATE 
PENrrENTIARY OF' VIRGINIA. . 
PE'l'ITION FOR A '\VRIT OF ER.ROR. 
To the Ilonorable .Iudges of the Supre·me Court of Appeal.~ 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Enoch \Vright, respee.tfully represents that 
he is _aggrieved by a judgment of the Circuit Court. of the 
City of Richmond, Virginia., rendered on the 25th day of J anu~ 
ary, 1933, in the above entitled case upon the judgment of the 
.Judge in denying hint a "\Vrit of Habeas Corp~ts, for his un-
lawful detention by the Sur)erintendent of the State Peni-
tentiary of Virginia. 
Herewith, under separate cover, is presented a transcript 
of record of the sajd case in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond, Virginia. The case at bar is n1ost interesting in 
that it presents two points of law hitherto undecided by the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of ,Virginia; the first one being 
whether or not a. person who has been convicted of a felony 
and been granted a conditional pardon is entitled to be credi-
ted with the period of time elapsing· between the date of hi~:; 
conditional pardon and the date of the revocation of said 
pardon. Another feature of this point is as to whether or 
not a person who has been granted a c.onditional pardon and 
the conditions of the said pardon lived up to during· the pe-
riod for whieh the person was sentenced to the penitentiary 
is held aceountable after the duration of the period of time 
for which l1e \Vas sentenced originally. The second po~nt of 
]a,v presented is; whether or not subsequet sentences run con-
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currently with the first sentence W'here it is not specified in 
the subsequent judgment or judgments, that such subsequent 
term or terms are to be served after the completion of a prior 
term or terms, in other "rord.s, is a person entitled to a con. 
current service of time in the Penitentiary during a second 
incarceration for a. second conviction while at the same time 
he is serving sentence for a prior conviction. Another ques-
tion of la'v to be considered is whether or not Enoch Wright 
is entitled under section 5017, Code of Virginia a.s am·ended 
and approved on ~:farch 11, 1932, for a fifteen day allowance 
per 1nonth for good behavior. 
STATEl\ti:ENT OF FACTS: 
\ 
Enoch "'\Vright "ras convicted in the Circuit Court of Wise \ 
County, Virginia., in F·ebruary, 1903, for second degree mur-
der and was thereupon sentenced to imprisonment for a total 
of seventeen years. This sentence was reduced forty-six days 
by Governor J\fontague. 
On February 1, 1910, he was relea.sed fronl the peniten-
tiary on a conditional pardon granted on the 29th day of J anu-
ary, 1910, by the then Governor of Virginia, the Honorable 
Claude A. Swanson. Among the conditions of said pardon 
were: 
"That he will conduct himself in the future as a good, law-
abiding citizen; 
. And that I expressly reserve the right to the Governor of 
.Virginia, to revoke this pardon at any time. 
And if he should violate any of the above conditions, or 
if ever again he be found guilty of a violation of the penal 
laws of the Conuuonwealth, this pardon shall be null and 
Yoid. '' 
At the ·time Wright began serving his sentence, and also 
at the time the conditional pardon was granted, the laws of 
Virginia provided a good conduct credit of four days per 
month; this law was amended about 1916, and provided for a 
good conduct credit of ten days per month, and Virginia's last 
Legislature provided for a good conduct credit of fifteen days 
per month, but it is not understood that tlris fifteen da.ys per 
month, applys in the case at bar. \Vright, through counsel, 
contends that it does a.pply in his case. According to the 
Penitentiary authorities, Enoch's conduct has been such a.s 
to entitle hin1 to this good time allowance. 
By virtue of the conditional pardon, Enoch Wright was 
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released from the Penitentiary February 1, 1910, after hav-
ing actually served approximately seven years of the said 
sentence. If he had remained in the Penitentiary without the 
allowance of the conditional pardon, he would have been re-
leased as a free n1an, at the completion of his sentence during 
1918. · From February, 1903, through the year of 1918, was 
the term of sentence which had to be served by Wright, and 
from F·ebruary 1, 1910, until1918, he was not serving his time 
in the Penitentiary, but by virtue of a gift of freedom for 
the remainder of his term, through the year of 1918 as long 
as he conducted himself during that time, as a good law-
abiding citizen and was not found guilty of a violation of the 
penal laws of the State of :Virginia, his pardon would hold 
good and his term of sentence of seventeen years would have 
been completed. In 1922, four years after his sentence of 
seventeen years, for his first conviction, would have been 
completed, Enoch Wright 'vas again ·sentenced to twelv·e years 
by the Wise County Circuit Court for second degree murder 
and re-committed to the Penitentiary. The date of this con-
viction was April13, 1922. On the same date, his conditional 
pardon of February t, lH10, was revoked. On March 6, 1924, 
he was c.onvictccl of being a repeater and sentenced to two 
addit~onal years by the Circuit Court of the City of Rich-
mond. It is admitted, according to the Penitentiary authori-
tise that a.t the time he was convicted of the second offense on 
April 13, 1922_, that the time left on his first sentence which 
1w had to serve when he returned to the Penitentiary, was 
. seven years, six months and eighteen days. It is further ad-
mitted that all of the time for a second conviction and for be-
ing a repeater, has been completed, and the only remaining 
time to be served according to the Penitentiary authorities, 
is for t.he remaining balance of seven years, six months, and 
eighteen days of the first sentence \vhich had not been com-
pleted by Wright at the tin1e he wa.s conditionally pardoned; 
but Wrig·ht, through his counsel, takes the position that this 
seven years~ six months. and eighteen days of the first ~en­
t.ence, cannot be invoked under the la.,v for the reason that he 
had been conditionally pa.rdoned on February 1, 1910, and for 
the time that he was a"ray from the Penitentiary he should 
be allowed a.s credit on his sentenee a.nd that his second con-
viction and the crime for ·which he was convicted the second 
- time, w·as not committed during that period of time for which 
he was first c01nmitted to the Penitentiary, but the said crime 
was perpetrated four years after t.he first term would ha.ve 
been con1pleted and therefore, the fa.ct that his conditional 
pardon ··was revoked in 1922, four years after his term of sen-
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tence would have been completed is not such a factor that 
would cause him to be returned to the Penitentiary to serve 
out the time between the da.te of his pardon, February 1, 1910, 
and the date on which he \vould have been released from the 
Penitentiary under that conviction, which would have been 
in 1918. Enoch Wright has served with unquestionably good 
conduct every minute that he has been confined within the 
penitentiary and also during the period of time that he was 
away from the Penitentiary during the term of sentence of 
seventeen years that he \vould have had to serve under the 
:first conviction. 
N.A.TURE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Upon the completion of his second sentence. and a hvo year 
repeater sentence, Enoch Wright, demanded his release, but 
.the Superintendent of the State. Penitentiary of Virginia, 
having Wright in his custody, refused the demand. There-
upon Enoch Wright sued out a Petition of Hribeas Corpus? 
alleging unlawful detention. 
THE Q"UESTION OF J..,,A )VAT ISSUE. 
There are hvo questions of la.\V to be determined in these 
proceedings 
Firstly: Whether or not \V right is en tiled to be credited 
with the time elapsing between the date of his conditional 
pardon and the date when I1c "\vas returned to the Penitentiary 
on account of a second conviction. If this question is an-
swered in the affirmative, then it is admitted that Wright has 
finished his sentence and is entitled to his liberty. 
Secondly: Whether or not Wright is entitled to be credited 
with a concurrent service o-f time during his second incarcera-
tion in the Penitentiarv for a second conviction. If this 
question is answered in the affirmative, and if the court should 
render its judgment, that at. the time he 'vas serving tile sen-
tence, which term of sentence under the second conviction 
should count on the sentence for ·which he was first convicted 
and both terms would run concurrently, then it will then be 
admitted that '\\Tright has finished his sentence and i.s en- --
titled to his liberty. Oonsidera.tion is given to these two 
points o£ law in the order in \Vhich they are mentioned. 
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THE ONLY VIRGINIA DECISION ON THIS QUESTION 
ARE FAVORABLE. 
There is a Virginia decision involving identically the same 
principles of law which should control this proceeding. 
In Scott vs. Chichester, 107 Va. 933, 60 S. E. 95, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that a prisoner serving· 
a jail sentence cannot be· paroled by the Judge of the Court 
during good behavior, a11d upon default remanded to jail to 
serve out the remainder of his time of confinement without 
counting the period during which he 'vas out on parole. 
In tha.t case the prisoner was sentenced to a. term of eig·ht 
n10nths in the City ~Tail, for assault. After serving less than 
five months, the prisoner moved the Court ''to suspend the 
Hentence and judg1nent against the prisoner'' a.nd the Court 
granted the motion and ordered the jailer to permit the pris-
oner "to leave the confines of the prison and to go at large". 
About two and n ha.~f months later the prisoner was re-
arrested on a charge of fighting, and found guilty. On sugges-
t.ion of the C'omnwnwealth Attorney that the prisoner was 
out of jail on probation, he was rmna.nded to jail, and later 
on, the Court which had originally sentenced him held a hear-
ing and deter1nined that the "prisoner had violated the terms 
of his pa.role' ', and, thereupon, remanded the prisoner back 
to ja.il ''to serve out the residue of his term of imprisonment". 
·upon the expiration of his original t<-~rm (counting as impris-
onment the time he had been out on parole) the prisoner 
sued out a writ of habeas corpzf.s. To an advers~ ruling he 
perfected an appeal. 
In deciding that the prisoner was entitled to credit for 
the tin1e that l1e was out on parole, the Supreme Court, be-
ginning on page H85, said : 
''No one can lw confined in prison in this C'mnmonwealth 
except by authority of la,v, and the practice shown by this 
proceedings cai1not be too severely condemned. The result 
of the practice in this case is that the prisoner was sentenced 
to serve another and additional punish1uent than that pro-
J:lOUnced upon h:m on- ~Iarch 21, 1907, for instead of eight 
months confinement in jail, he would suffer for the same of-
fense eight months confinement in jail and for the period be-
hveen August 10 and October 28th, 1.907, partial co-nfinettnent, 
·while physi.caUy ont of :iail; bnt morally and actually 'Under 
the restraint of h,is par_ole and nndet· the ·orde1·s of the 
_ja-i' er." (Italics ours.) 
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After reviewing some, further authorities collateral to the 
question, the Supreme Court decided that since the prisoner 
was entitled to credit for the time out on parole when he wa.s 
in "partial confinement", his detention !by the jailer after 
the exp:ration of the tin1e of his original sentence was illegal 
and void. Therefore, the S~1preme Court entered the order 
in which it said the lower Court should have entered :-''dis-
charging the prisoner from custody". 
In the case at bar the prisoner was convicted by the trial 
court and sentenced to seventeen years. Thereupon the ju-
risdiction of the trial court or any court or governmental 
agency terminated so far as carrying· the period of sentence 
beyond that seventeen year period. The question that now 
arises is this: After this prisoner (Enoch Wright} had 
served a part of that time, that is to say, seven years, and 
time off for good behavior, the Governor has issued a condi-
tional pardon and the prisoner, after his freedom under this 
pardon covering a period of t.v.rel ve years, can the prisoner 
then be in incarcerated and required to complete the rest of 
his unexpired sentence, notwithstanding the fact tha.t the ul-
timate limits of that sentence has passed. This question is 
disposed of part~a.~]y in the ·virginia. case of Richa1·dson vs. 
Com,'Jnonwealth, 109 S. E. 460, in which case a man entered a 
plea of guilty before a trial court and was given a thirty day 
jail sentence, 'vhich 'vas to be suspended. The maximum 
that the defendant could have received was a sentence of six 
months and no more. In that case the thirty day jail sen-
tence period and the period of six tnonths whieh he might 
have been sentenced, passed, and thereafter the defendant 
was arrested on another c.hargc and "ras convicted and after 
this conYiction was brought into court on a rule to show cause 
why his original thirty clay sentenee should not be irnposed; 
the answer of the defendant to that 'vas that the term of 
court having expired that there could he no further order 
of the court since the original order had 1become final and 
"THAT SINCE THE OR.DER OF THE COURT COULD 
NOT HA \TE EXTENDED 1\tiORE THAN THIRTY DAYS 
A.ND TO THE GHEATEST EXTENT ].fORE THAN SIX 
!vtONTHS, WHICH vV A.S THE ~I~~I~IUlVI Al\IIOUNT 01P 
SENTENCE Tl-IAT COULD BE PR.ONOUNCED, 
NEITHER COlTLD THE .JURISDICT:EON OF THE 
001TR·T COVER. A GREATER PER.lOD OF TI~iE THAN 
THE SENTENCE AND THAT THE PERIOD OF TI].iE 
OF THE SENTENCE HAVING ELAPSED THE· COURT 
WAS U.N ABLE TO ENFORCE FURTFIER QR.DERS' '. 
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The .Supreme Court, in this case states on page 462 of 109 
S. E. that: 
"It is also urged in this ca·se that the commitment of the 
accused to jail in this proceeding is invalid because the maxi-
munl period for which he might originally have been sen-
tenced had elapsed before the rule was issued, and that there-
fore the court had no power under the statute to revoke the 
suspension of sentence. This presents a more difficult ques-
tion. 
( 4, 5) The statute is highly remedial and should be liber-
ally construed, but it is most important that the General As-
sembly shall clarify it by amendment. Clarifying its ob-
scurities as best we can, it is manifest that the authority 
either to suspend the imprisonment or the execution of sen-
tence is committed to the trial court judges. The draftsman 
of the act appears to have had in mind that in the discre-
tion of the judge there might be two alternatives: (l) That 
the convicted person n1ight be placed on probation; that is, 
discharged on condition that he would he of good behavior, 
either with or without supervision and without any express 
limitation of the period during which this probation should 
continue. (2) There might be such a suspension of the sentence 
either with or without the supervision of a probation officer 
for a definite period until the further order of the court. 
The court is tl1ercby given an1ple po,ver, not only to determine 
the conditions to be imposed in each case, but is expressly 
given power to revoke the suspension and cause the defend-
ant to be arrested and again brought before the court for 
pnnishme11t. This an1ple power of revocation, however, with 
its limitations, are expressed in the statute in these words: 
''The court may revoke the suspension of sentence and 
cause the defendant to ·be arrested and broug·ht before the 
court at any tin1e within the probation period, or within the 
maximum period for which the defendant mig·ht originally 
lwve been sentenced to be imprisoned.'' 
While the precise meaning of this clause is not perfectly 
apparent, its purpose to limit the period within which the sus-
pension order can be revoked is manifest. It is clear that 
within such limited period the court is expressly authorized 
to revoke the suspension and impose the penalty, but not 
thereafter. This prescribed and limited period is expressed 
in the alternative; that is, the court may revoke the sus-
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pension either at any time within the probation period1 or 
within the maximun1 period for which the defendant m1ght 
originally have been sentenced to ilnprisonment. The clause 
'vould more clearly express its meaning if the word "or', 
were followed by the words, ''if no probation period has been 
prescribed then". vVith this interpolation the meaning of 
the statute would ·be perfectly clear. The Legislature clearly 
could not have intended to make the jurisdiction of the trial 
court to revoke the suspension a n1atter of uncertainty in any 
particular case·. The intention was to pr~scribe and limit 
the power of the court. As in this case the trial court did 
not prescribe a definite period during which the suspension 
of the sentence should continue, unless we adopt the conrlu-
sion sugg-ested, we would be driven to conclude that the court 
might retain its jurisdiction OVer the defendant and hold hinL 
subject to its order indefinitely. While the court may fix 
the period of probation, a careful consideration of the lan-
guag·e used leads us to the conclusion that in those causes in 
which the court fails to prescribe such period of probation de-
finitely; the alternative clause of the statute operates and it-
self lin1its the power of revocation to ''the maximum period 
for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced 
to be imprisoned''. . 
The maximum period for 'vhich the accused could be im-
prisoned for this crime appears to be six months. In this case 
it appears that more than six months had elapsed after the 
original suspension of the sentence, N ovemlber 10, 1919, and 
before the date of the issuance of the rule, December 14, 1920. 
As this maximum period had expired before .the rule 'vas 
issued, 've are of opinion that the court exGeeded its power 
in assuming further jurisdiction of the case. At any time 
within six months, under the statute, the court had plenary 
power to revoke the order of suspension and impose the pen-
alty of imprisonment, but not after the expiration of that 
maximum period. 
In the case at bar (Enoch Wright, tl1e trial court sen-
tenced him to s·eventeeli years, from the cla.te of trial which 
was the February term, 1903, of the vVise County 'circuit 
Court, and upon the elapsing of that period of time in the 
form of seYente.en continuous years from the date of judg-
ment to the date of its con1pletion, "ras a period in which 
the court perl1aps could not act but executive clemency could 
be exercised, but. once exercised, it could not go beyond the 
seventeen yea.r period of the sentence and therefore upon 
tl1e prisoner being paroled in 1910 and out. under that parole 
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twelve years or n1ore than four years beyond the date of the 
comp~etion of the seventeen year tern1 of confinement, it is 
'vithout the jurisdiction of the court or governmental agency 
so far as restricting him beyond that seventeen year sen- , 
tence. The case of In Re: P,rmtt, 12 Idaho 494, is in line with 
the case at bar. The syllabus ·of that case states: 
''Conditions attached to a parole or pardon by the Board 
of Pardons, that are to extend beyond or be performed after 
the expiration of the term for ·which the prisoner was sen-
tenced, are illegal and cannot be ·enforced after the expira-
tion of the term for which the prisoner was sentenced. 
A prisoner 'vho has been paroled by the Board of Par-
dons and thereafter re-arrested and returned to the peniten-
tiary, for a violation of the conditions attached to the parole, 
is entitled to his d:scharge at the. expiration of the period· 
of time for which he was sentenced by the court, and he cannot 
be lawfu1ly detained under such sentence for the purpose of 
serving an additional term equaling the time he was out 011 
parole." 0 The Court states in the case In Re: P1·oui, that: 
"It appears equally clear to us that a. pardon 'vhether ab-
solute or condit:oual, is not effec.tiYe until received and ac~ 
cepted. Insofar as a clemency has once been received and 
enjoyed, it would seem impossible to recall or revoke it. The 
revocation could only extend that part not yet enjoyed. Par-
don or executive clemency is a gift. One 'vho promises to 
make a gift n1ight keep h:s pron1ise in who1e or in part, or he 
may decline entirely, hut after the delivery he cannot re-
cover the thing· given and even if he should again come into 
possession of it, l1e cannot retain it." · #l Page on Con- 0 
tracts, Section 281. "He may decline at any time he pleases, 
to give any n1ore, hut that fact does not divest the donee of 
title to that which he oha:s a! ready received. In that view of 
the case while the pardoning· board 'vould have unquestion-
able authority to recall their parole and return to prison at 
any thne, it seems equa1ly clear that they cannot wipe out or 
obliterate' the clemency the prisoner has already received and 
enjoyed. It wou~cl seem strange if they can turn around aucl 
punish him the samP length of time that he has been en-
joying their c~emency. The tenu for which the prisoner was 
sentenced, having expired, the \Varden ha.s no authority for 
his further detention.'' 
0 1Voodward vs. 1J1urdock, 124 Ind. 444; 24 N. E. Rep. 1047, 
is to the effect that: · 
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Where a prisoner violates the conditions of a pardon as to 
good conduct, and that he shall not violate the law, before the 
expiration of the tenn for which he was sentenced, he is only 
subject to imprisonn1ent for the remainder of 'the term of 
the sentence originally imposed, less the time earned for 
good behavior while imprisoned and the ·sentence is not con-
sidered to be as suspended. The case of State vs. Hunte1·, 
124 Iowa 569, 100 N. W. Rep. 510, adopts the reasoning iu 
the above case and states that an executive cannot stipulate 
as a consequence of the revocation of the privilege granted 
and accepted, that the prisoner •shall serve a longer time 
than that which he has been sentenced. The question has 
come up in several jurisdictions as to whether or not a void 
provision or suspension by '\Vhich the operation of a sentence 
was stayed, made the sentence unenforceable after the time 
for 'vhich the sentence intposed has passed. The cases which 
support this proposition are U. 8. vs. TV~lson, 46 Fed. 7 48; 
Ex Pat·te, Clendenning, 22 Okla. 108, 97 Pac. 650; 19 L. R. A. 
1041, 132 Am. State Rep. 628; Ex Pa·rte, Peterson, 19 Idaho 
433; 113 Pac. 729, 33 L. R. A. 1067; In Re: Strickler·, 51 Kan-
sas 700, 33 Pa.c. 620; State vs. Sapp, 87 J{ansas 740, 125 Pac. 
78, 42 L. R. A. 249. Some cases hold that a sentenee be-
comes operative when it is pronounced and ends when the time 
of impriso1unent therein mentioned has expired, although no 
imprisonment be suffered. In Re: Webb, 89 Wis. 354, 27 L. 
R. A. 356; In Re: Markuso·u, 5 N.D. 180, 64 N. W. 939. Thb 
rule insisted on by son1e other courts, is that the court loses 
jurisdiction after it ha.s discharg·ed the prisoner, althoug·h the 
discharge was in violation of the constitution and statute 
laws of the State. U. S. ,.s. lVilson, 46 Fed. 748; G·rundel vs. 
People, 33 Colo. 191, Am. St. Rep. 75; People vs. Barnett, 
202 Ill. 287, 67 N. E. 232, 9'5 Am. St. Rep. 230. 
It has been held that the conditions of a pardon must be 
such as may be kept and perforrned or complied ·with dur-
ing the. tenn for which the prisoner '\vas sentenced by the 
judgment of the court. See In Re: Pro·u.t, 12 Idaho 494. 86 
Pac. 275, 10 Ann Case 199, 5 L. R. A. 1064: · 
At the end of the case of Conunon-wea.lth ·vs. Dabney, Rob· 
inson 1, p. 696, there is an excellent monographic note on 
pardons. The case of Lee Sergeant vs. ll!J.urphy, 22 Gratton, 
p. 282, gives a very excellent discourse upon the subject of 
pardons and holds that the object of the court in construing 
instruments of this character, speaking of pardons, is to carry 
out the intention of parties a11d wherever that is doubtful, 
the granting is interpreted, most beneficially for the citizen 
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or subject. This is an Universal rule in the interpretation of 
pardons. One Bishop, Criminal Law 757, and cases cited. 
It further b.olds that the conditions annexed to a pardon 
must not be in1possible, immoral or illegal. 
IN VIRGINIA_:"CONDITIONAL PARDON''--.(OF THE 
WRIGHT TYPE) IS THE SAME AS "PAROLE". 
In Virginia there is no statutory or conditional express 
authority for the Governor to grant a "parole'' or a "condi-
tional pardon''. 
·section 73 of the Constitution, dealing with the duties and 
powers of the Governor, provides that the Governor "shall 
have power * * * to grant reprieves and pardons after 
conviction". 
Section 5069 of the Code of Virginia does not expressly 
provide for the granting of a. pardon except by implication in 
the statmnent that ''the Governor shall not gTant a pardon 
in any case before conviction". 
In some of the early cases in .Virginia, it 'vas held that 
the Governor of Virginia had no ~.uthority to grant a condi-
tional pardon ( Conunonwealth vs. Fowle1·, 8 Va. 35; Ball vs. 
Co1nm.onwealth, 35 Va. 726), but in a later case (Lee vs. Mu.r-
phy, 63 Va. 789), the Court held that the Governor of :virginia 
has authority under the constitution to gTant a conditional 
pardon. This later decision was founded upon the theory that 
si11ce the Governor had the rig·ht to grant an absolute pardon, 
it must necessarily follo'v by implication that he had the 
rjght to do a lesser thing, namely: to grant a pardon with 
certain conditions annexed. 
An examination of the authorities on the question leads to 
the conclusion that ,·vhen granted by the Governor, a condi-
tional pardon 'vith conditions such as were imposed upon 
Wright. is the same in the eyes of the law as a parole, since 
the effect of each instrument is to grant the prisoner a con-
ditional leave of absence from his place of confinement and 
to substitute therefor the partial restriction and partial 
custody provided for in the parole or conditional pardon. 
The only real difference behveen a "parole'' and a "condi-
tional pardon" is that a parole is the order of release ordi-
narily issued by a parole board stipulating· certain condi-
tions of behavior and conduct under which a prisoner may 
be released from the penitentiary or jail, as the case may 
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be; while a conditional pardon is a similar document, of simi-
_lar effect, issued by the Governor, under his constitutional 
powers. 
In 46 Corpus Juris, "Pardon", Section 67, it is shown that 
a pardon with conditions attached relating to good conduct 
and la-wful behavior and requiring periodical reports to 
some lawful authority, is the same in the eyes of the law as a 
parole, the above authority saying: · 
''The rule sustained by the weigl1t of authority is that the 
power to pardon includes the power to parole • • In 
some jurisdictions, 'vhile a pardon is not considered a con-
ditional pardon; the pardoning power is held to have the 
.power to grant a parole in effect by bestowing a conditional 
pardon, with conditions annexed, such as are incident" to a 
parole." (Citing State vs. Yates, 183 N. C. sub. 53, 111 S .. 
E. 337; and in re: Co~trt of Pa,-rdons (N. J.), 129-A 644.) 
THE BETTER REASONING OF ,sECONDARY AU-
THORITIES ARE FAVORABLE ~I'O THE 
PETITION. 
In 20 Ruling Case Law·, under the title of ''Pardons, Re-
prieves and Amnesty", Section 59, page 571, after referring 
to the contrary v~ew held by the Courts in a number of States 
(in practically all of 'vhich, however, the statutory law ex-
pressly stipulates that nocredit. shall be allowed for time out 
on conditional pardon, and in others the language of the con-
ditional pardon itself so stipulated) the better reasoned nde 
is laid down as follo"Ts: 
''According to the rule applied in some Courts, I1owever, 
a sentence is not to be considered as suspended during the 
tin1e a prisoner is out on parole or conditional pardon, bnt on 
a violation of the c.onditions the time between the granting of 
the parole or pardon and the su bsequcnt a.rrest is to be 
taken to be, a part of the term of sentence, and he is entitled to 
his discharge at the expiration of the period of thne for 'vhich 
he 'vas sentenced hy the court, and he cannot be lawfully de-
tained under such sentence for the purpose of serving an 
additional term equaling the time he was at Hbert.y. This 
rule is supported l1y two argurnents. The first is 'that the 
·effect of a ·release 1mder the conditional pardon or parole, 
espec.ia.lly whe·re the convict is bound to 1nake periodlic re-
po·rts, is not to make him, a free 1nan bu.t he is 'nierely serving 
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his sentence in a different way fro'ln being confined to prison." 
"The other argument is that a conditional pardon amounts 
to a gift to the convict of the period of time represented by 
his sentence, and that as to so Inuch of it as he has enjoyed 
the executiv<:.. cannot recall, and that the revocation of a par-
don for cond·;tion broken can o·nly extend to tht£t part not yet 
enjoyed.'' (Italics ours.) 
In 46 Corpus Juris, under the title of ''Pardon", Section 81, 
it is said: 
'' Th.ere is a conflict of authority on the question whether 
a prisoner whose parole has been revoked can be imprisoned 
for a period of tin1e equalling the balance of the sentence not 
served at the time of the granting of the parole, some courts 
holding that that period of thne must be served, and others 
hold,ing tha.t the pr·isoner tnttst be discharged at the expiration 
of the period of time for which he wa.s sentenced.'' (Italics 
ours.) 
In 20 Huling Case Law, ''Pardon, etc.',., Section 37, page 
553, it is held that the revocation of a conditional pardon 
does not deprive the prisoner of the benefit of a diminution 
of his term of in1prisonn1ent on account of good conduct al-
lowance. There it is said: 
''The diminution of imprisonnwnt provided for by statute 
is a privilege of which the prisoner can be deprived only in 
accordance with the provisions of the statute and if no pro-
,~ision was made for forfeiture of this privilege on account 
of violation of the tel'lns of the conditional pardon by the 
executive, no such forfeiture can be imposed by the executive 
under any condition or stipulation inserted in the conditional 
pardon, although the prisoner n1ay have assented to it. 
''Such a condition, as a. consequence of the revocation of 
a pardon, would in pffect require the petitioner to serve a 
longer term of imprisonment than that for which he had 
been sentenced, for it is a rule that an act of the Legislature 
specifically defining <"reclit for good behavior, in existence at 
the date of the judgment against the prisoner, becomes a 
part of the sentence and inheres in the punishment assessed.'' 
The fact that the Virginia law with regard to pardons con-
tains no provision \vhatever that, in the event of a revoca.tiou, 
the convict ~hall not be credited with the tinw elapsing be-
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tween the date of the pardon and the date of the revocation, 
is very significant. The fact that the laws of several other 
strutes contain specific provisions to this effect, rather 
strongly indicates that ·where there is no specific provision to 
this effect, the contrary rule ho~ds true. In other words, in 
the absence of specific statutory provision to the contrary the 
prisoner is entitled to credit on his s-entence for that por-
tion of time spent lawfully outside of prison walls, but never-
theless, in legal custody and with his liberty restrained under 
the terms of the conditional pardon. 
It is very in1portant to note that the terms of the condi-
tional pardon issued by Governor 'Swanson do not any when~ 
specify that, in the event of revocation, the prisoner .would 
be forced to serve the ·rmnainder of his term without any 
credit whatever for the time spent in partial custody between 
the date of the pardon and the date of the revocation. If 
the Governor had the rig·ht to insert such a provision, under 
the wel1 known rule of construction of such documents,. the 
absence of any such provision from the conditional pardon 
should be construed in favor of the prisoner, to the effect that 
the intent of the parties in their agreement wus not to deprive 
the prisoner of credit for this time spent in partial custody 
and restricted liberty while he was out on parole or under the 
provisions of the conditional pardon. 
FAVORABLE DECISIONS IN OTI-IER JURISDICTION~. 
In the very recent case of Crooks 'vs. Sanders (S. C.), 115 
S. E. 760, 28 A. L. R. 940~ it was held that a parole did not 
suspend the runnipg of the sentence of the prisoner, but 
1nerely permitted hhn a conditional leave of absence from 
prison under the conditions stipulated in the parole. Conse-
quently, it was held that the prisoner was entitled to have the 
time on which he was out on pa.role credited as a part of his 
prison sentence, and also tha.t he wa.s entitled to the diminu-
tion of sentence for good conduct while out on parole. 
The conditional pardon confern~d upon the prisoner all 
the rights and privileges and immunities of a free citizen, 
subject only to the condition tha.t he continue his good be-
havior. This good behavior 'vas exercised on the part of 
the prisoner during· the remaining part of the sentence for 
which he was first convicted and it W3"; not during that period 
of ti1ne that he violated the conditions of his pardon, as it 
was not until four years after the completion of his sentence 
did he get h1 trouble again. C'onsequently the decision of 
C·ropks YS. Sanders, should be very persausive in the deter-
lnination of this case. 
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As the court pointed out in Crooks vs. Sanders, supra: 
'' 'Vhile the object of the courts in construing instruments of 
his character is to carry out the intention of the parties, 
"rherever that is doubtful the grant is construed most bene-
ficially for the citizen and most strongly against the sover-
eign power. As a pardon is an act of grace, it is a universal 
rule of interpretation tha.t limitations upon the operation of 
such a g-rant of clemency should be strictly construed.'' 
In the case of Anderson vs. WillianM, 279 Fed. 822, the 
United States Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth 
Circuit handed down a. very convincing opinion in 
which the Court rejected the contention of the penitentiary 
'varden that the Federal Parole Btoard, which had there-
fore paroled the prisoner under terms of good behavior, re-
porting· to the 'va.rden once a ''reek, etc., could thereafter re-
voke the parole at. such time and to such extent as to cause 
the prisoner to serve a longer terrn than that for which he was 
originally sentenced. 
In that case the 'varclen 's contention was strengthened by 
a provision in the Federal la'v to the effect that: 
"If the order of parole be revoked and the parole so ter-
minated, the said prisoner shall . ~erve lhe remainder 
of the sentence originally imposed; and the ti1ne th~ 
prisone·r was mtt on paro'1 e shall not be taken into accownt 
to i/.i.ininish the ti'me for which he was sentenced." (Italics 
ours.) 
The court. ho"rever. rejected the contention of the war-
den and held that such a construction 'vould be "unreason-
able". The eourt also rejected the 'varden's.contention that-
the parole suspended the running of the prisoner's sentence. 
Commenting on this tl1e court said: (at page 826 and 827)-
''This eontention, however, fails to con1mend itself to our 
judg-ment. A parole of a prisoner by the Board of Parole un-
der the Acts of June 25, 1910, is not a suspension of a sen-
tence. On the other hand. it is a substitution during the con-
tinuance of. the parole, of a lower grade of punishment, by 
confinement in the legal eustody and under the control of the 
'varden within the specified prison bounds outside the prison, 
for tl1e confinement within the prison adjudged by the court. 
It is the ~uthorized substitution during the existence of 
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the Parole through the clemency of the Board of a li~htet­
punishment for that originally prescribed by the JU~g­
ment. But. the prisoner is ·not free of his sentence wlttle• 
he is out of the f)·ri.c;on 'U·nrle·r the 1Jarole. 
lie is still se1·vin_q his sentence. Bv virtue thereof~ he is 
still confined within the specified bounds outside of the prison, 
still in the legal custody of the warden, and subject'to all the 
terms of the sentence of the court of which he is not e;xpressly 
relieved, and the t·i·me of his confinentent under the parole 
runs and 'must be ab' owed in his favor as long as h-is parole is 
not lawfully ~revoked to the sa.1ne extent as it wo~1-ld have 1·un 
and have been allowed if he had been actu4lly confined in the 
penitentiary d·uring that time." (Italics ours.) 
Citing·:-HToodwa.rd vs. lf!urdock, 124 Ind. 439, 24 N. E. 
1047, 1048; in 1·e P·rout, 12 Idaho 494, 86 Pac. 275, .276, 277, 
5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1064, 10 Ann. Cas. 199; People vs. Homer, 
107 lVIisc. Rep. 677, 177 N. Y. Supp. 482'' 
In the case of TV oodwat·d vs. J'tu.rdoclc (124 Ind. 439), the 
Supreme Court of Indiana held the a. prisoner 'vas entitled to 
his discharge at the expiration of the time for ·which his origi-
nal sentence ran, after crediting the thne to 'vhich he was en-
titled under the laws of credit for good conduct, although dur-
ing· a part of the time covered by the sentence he 'vas free on 
parole, the conditions of which he violated. 
In that case the Governor reserved the right to revoke the 
pardon at any time (a. shnilar provision is found in the Wrig·ht 
pardon), and the Supreme Court held that under those cir-
cumstances "the appellant was at larg·e merely at the will of 
the Governor" and that consequently he was "in the cus-
tody" during that time that he was out on parole and 'vas en-
titled to have tha.t time counted in computing the· date when 
he should be released from prison. 
On page 444, in commenting on this point, the court said: 
"During the time that. he ·w·as out on parole he was not a 
free citizen; he \\ras, as we have seen, Atil1 a prisoner, and not-
'vithsta.nding his pris~n bound-s \Vere not so contracted as 
\Vere the prison bounds of the insolvent debtor, a.t the time 
our laws recognized imprisonment for debt, still he was within 
prison bounds. 
He was not permitted to come ·into the State of Indiana .. 
All the consequences of the judg·ment "rere upon hin1, except 
that he had leave of absence from the prison. As the appel-
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lant was a prisoner absent from the prison by proper au-
thority, under no view of the case, in our opinion, eould his 
imprisonment be eontinued longer than the period for which 
l1e was sentenced, less his credit for good time. 
But if the appellant is to be reg·arded as having been a 
free 1nan during the time he was out of prison on parole, 
he was entitled to his re!ease· at the time this proceeding was 
instituted. It was only by virtue of the judg·ment of the 
~fa.rion Criminal Court that the appellant was held as a pris-
oner; it by its very terms only condemned him to five years 
from its date less any time for which under the law he might 
be entitied to c.redit. See also section 6134 R .. S. 1881. 
The law allowing him credit for good time entered into 
tl1e judg1nent as if written therein, and, therefore, by the very 
language of the judgment the appellant's time expired on 
the 13th day of December, 1889. 
The appellant could not extend the ti·me of his i1npriso·n-
1nent by cont1·act wUh the Governor any m.ore than he coulcl 
ha.ve beco·me a 1Jrisonr.r in the first instance by contract. It 
is only by virtue of the judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction that a citizen can be condemned to imprisonment, 
and when the time expires for which the sentence runs, as 
g-iven in the judgment, the prisoner is entitled to his dis-
charge.'' 
The law of Virginia expressly provides tha.t the term of con-
finement sha ~I connnence and he con1puted from the date of 
final judgment. (Va. Code, Sec. 5019.) 
One of the strongest cases on this question is the case of 
In Re Prout (Idaho), 86 Pac .. 275, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1064. 
In that case the prisoner was sentenced to three years con-
finement in the penitentiary (the sentence providing that the 
ter1n would "comn1ence on the date of delivery of the pris-
oner to the penitentiary warden''). 
After serving half of the sentence the prisoner was pa-
roled; was out on-parole for six n1onths 'vhen his parole was 
revoked and he 'vas returned to the penitentiary. After the 
three years orig·inal term had expired, the prisoner sued out 
a writ of Ila.bea.s Corpus. 
The Prout parole also had in it a condition that if it was 
revoked the prisoner ''should serve out the full unserved time 
of his ori,g·i11a l sentence without any commutation of time" 
(thPre w·as no such provision. in "'\Vrig-ht's conditional par-
don). 
The Parole Board likewise reserved the right to revoke the 
parole at any time, just as Governor Swanson reserved the 
l 
i 
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right. of revocation to himself and future Governors in the 
conditional pardon of Wright. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho, in considering this case, held 
for the prisoner, ·and ordered his release. On page 1066 ( 5 
L. R. A. N. S.) of the opinion the Court said: 
''The Board of Pardons belong-s to the E:Xeeutive Depart-
tnent of the State. and its privileg·e and prerogative is that 
of granting clemency. It is a Board of Clemency, ra:ther than 
a punitive body * • * Whenever such Board undertakes 
to increase or extende a penalty of punishment impos·ed on a 
convict by decree of court, they at once pass beyond the realm 
of their jurisdiction, and infringe upon the judicial powers 
of the State." 
Even so, in the Wright case, it might well be said that the 
Governor, in his exercise of his pardoning power is exercis-
ing a prerogative of clemency. and that he has no power to 
impose conditions the effect of which would be, in case of revo-
cation, to increase and lengthen the imprisonment of the pun-
ishment imposed upon the convict by the judicial branch of 
the government represented by the sentencing court. 
Completely disposing of the argument that while the pris-
oner was out on parole he was "not in confinement" and was 
not serving his sentence, and consequently that the time out 
on parole shou~d not be emnputed in figuring· the expiration 
of his imprisonment after revocation, the Idaho court said, 
on page 1076: 
''It certa.inly cannot be said that a man is a free man enjoy-
ing the liberty of freedom usually accorded to other citizens, 
when he is subject a.t. any day and 'vithout notice of the right 
of trial or the right of appeal of the courts to be taken to 
the State Penitentiary and there imprisoned and confined, at 
the will of the desig·na ted official.'' 
This same argument applies with full force in Wright's 
ease, for his liberty was restricted; and for the period of time 
for which he 'vas first convicted of seventeen years, he stood 
'vit.hin the shado'v of the walls of the penitentiary for the 
slightest violation of any penal law or for the violation of his 
g·ood behavior. Furthermore, by the very terrns of the cort-
ditional pardon reserving the right of revocation to the Gov-
ernor, Wright "ras "subject at any "day and without notice or 
the right of trial or the right to appeal to the courts, to be 
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taken to the State Penitentiary and there imprisoned and con .. 
fined at the will of the designated official''. 
Upon the gift being conferred upon Wright of being aJ .. 
lowed his freedom fron1 the penitentiary for the period of 
his term of sentence under his first conviction, there· was a 
constant fear in the mind of the convict that should he make 
the slightest mistake he 'vould be returned to the penitentiary 
to serve the tin1e t.hat had elapsed at the time he would be re-
turned to the penitentiary. Now if Wright was freed under 
pardon in 1910 and in 1.91'1 his pardon was revoked, it is not 
questioned by counsel for Wright, that he would have to serve 
the remaining balance of the time between the revocation of 
his pardon and the time remaining to be served upon his 
sentence, but in the hypothetical case, the one year that he 
was out under the conditional pardon during which time he 
behaved himself and up to the time his pardon was revoked, 
it is clear cut law that he should be allowed credit for that 
one year. Then the same should follow if he 'vere .out under 
a pardon for seven years a~d there remained but six months 
of his sentence to be served, that he would s·erve the same; 
but in the case at bar upon his sooond conviction he had been 
out from the penitentiary over twelve years and there re-
mained no time for him to serve under his ·first sentence, as 
it had ·all been completed by 'the passing of the years until 
the seventeenth year had tolled at vrhich time his first sentence 
had been completed and the shado'v of the walls of the peni-
tentiary could beckon to him no longer. 
It is not just tha.t a man should be given a gift such as a 
dollar and the dollar be spent, and the donor later to call 
upon the person to whom the present was given and ask that 
the same be given back to him. Should the donee replace the 
same he will be in the position of having spent the dollar 
that he mig·ht not have ordinarily spent, and replace the same 
dollar which the donee could not afford. That is similar to 
the case at bar. Wrig-ht was given twelve years .of freedom 
and twelve years from the date of his freedom he is forced 
to return to prison to serve the remaining time of his sentence 
of which there is none, and therefore he would be entitled to 
his freedom. 
In other words, for the twelve years that he was out under 
a conditional pardon, he would be allowed no credit and would 
have to go back to prison and serve the remaining· seven 
years that remained at the time he was gTanted the conditional 
pardon, in otl1er words, the twelve years that he was out., 
would be lengthened by seven years· additional in the peniten-
tiary, making a total of the remaining sentence of nineteen 
~--·------~·-··- -- ~ 
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yea;rs in addition to the ·seven years that he had actually 
served, totaling twenty-six years, which from every stand-
point is unjust, unequitable, and illegal. . 
The opinion in the Prout case shows clearly that any other 
ruling would result in the prisoner's not only serving the 
full time to which he was sentenced by the convicting court, 
but also serving· an additional term of what must be termed 
at least "pa.rtia.I imprisonment" when his liberty is restricted 
and with the possibility of a revocation of the conditional 
pardon constantly hanging over him, day and night, like an 
impending· cloud of doom. 
The Idaho court pointed out in this connection that clem-. 
ency was an act of grace and a gift, and that once given it 
could be revoked only as to suc-h portion of the gift as had not 
actually been used. On page 1067 the court said, on this phas~ 
of the matter :-
''Insofar as clmuency has once been received and enjoyed,. 
it would seem ilupossible to recall or revoke it. The revoca-
tion cottld only extend to that part not yet enjoyed * * * 
lVhile the pardoning board would have unquestionable au-
thority to recall the parole and return the prisoner at any 
time, it seetns equally cle£w that they ca;nnot 'Wipe ottt or ob-
l·iterate the cleme·ncy the p1·isoner has already 1·eceived and 
e·njoyed. It 'vould seem strange if they can turn around and 
punish him the same length of tirne that he has been enjoy-
ing their clemency." (Italics ours.) 
Even so, in the Wright case, if the time which elapsed be-
hveen the date of the conditional pardon and the date when 
Wrig·ht's pardon was revoked should not be credited on his 
term, then 've would have the unreasonable and, in the eyes 
of equity, impossible situation of forcing· '\Vright to serve 
''rithin the ·four walls of the penitentiary his full term of · 
imprisonment as fixed by the sentence of the convicting court, 
in addition to serving the period of twelve years of '' substi-
tuted imprisonment'' while he was out under the pardon, 
yet still in the custody of the law, with the shadow of pos-
sible revocation of his pardon always before him, and with his 
liberty restricted in many ways cornporting only 'vith a form 
of imprison1nent. 
Such a ruling would in effect give the Governor the power 
of increasing the punishment of the convict, 'vhereas under 
the constitution and the law, the only power that the Governor 
has is that of clemency, which is, decreasing punish·ment. 
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The Prout case receives the hearty endorsmuent of the edi-
tors of 5 L. R. A., whose note on page 1064, comn1ents as fol- · 
lows: 
''Reason, if not the weig·ht of authority, would seem to be 
with the proposition laid down in ex pa-rte Prout that the con-
ditions annexed to the pardon of a convicted criminal cannot 
be enforced after the expiration of his sentence.'' 
APPARENTLY UNFAVORABLE DE·CI,SIONS ARE 
BASED l.TPON SPECIFIC STATUTORY PROVIS-
IONS NOT EXISTING IN VIRGINIA. 
The most recent annotation covering· the direct quest~on 
here involved is found in 28 American Law Reports, pag·e 947 
and the following pages. In that annotation, among other 
things, 've find the follo"ring: 
"View. That Tim.e Out on Parole is Pa1·t of Sentence. In 
son1e juriscEc.tions the view obtains that when a convict is re-
leased on parole the time during which he is at large under 
the parole is part of his sentence, and is to be deducted from 
the term thereof in determining whether tl1ere is au unserved 
portion of the sentence to which he is subject in case of a vio-
lation of the conditions of his parole.'' Anderson vs. JYilliwms 
(1922), 279 Fed. 822; Re Prout (1906), 12 Idaho 494, 5 L. R. 
A.. (n. s.) 1064, 86 Pac. 275, 10 Ann. ·Cas. 199; 1Voodward vs. 
1Jl1trdock (1890), 124 Ind. 439, 24 N. E. 1047; Scott vs. Chiches-
ter (1.908), 107 .Va. 9:13; 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 304, 60 S. E. 95.· 
And see the reported case (Crooks vs. S,anrle1·s, ante, 940). 
SUPERINTENDENT'S REFUSAL ~0 RELEASE 
\VRIGHT IS BASED UPON .A. lVIISAPPLICATION 
OF .A. SPECIAL I,A W IfA VING NOTHING TO 
DO WITH WRIGHT'S CASE. 
The detention of \Vrig-ht probably being- caused by the un-
derstanding of the Superintendent that "no n1an would be al-
lowed credit for time not actually served in prison''. This 
understanding is doubtless based upon .Section 5019 of the 
Virginia Code, in ·which section the followin~· sentence oc-
curs: 
"But. in no case shall a prisoner be al1owed credit for time 
not actually spent in confinement, and in no case is a pris-
oner on bail to be regarded as in confinement for the purposes 
of this statute.'' 
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A reading ·of the entire statute, however, will disclose that 
it has no reference whatever to the facts in Wright's case, 
but that it refers only to when a tern1 of. confinement shall 
commence and be con1puted, and a.!so to what credit off of a 
term of confinement shall be allowed the prisoner for the. 
''time actually spent by such person in jail awaiting trial, 
or pending an appeal''. 
This Section-Section 501!>-has no reference whatever to 
credits occurring to a prisoner by virtue of good conduct for 
that subject is g·overned entirely by another statute.--:Sec-
tion 5017. Furtherrnore, it has no application to the question 
of whether or not time on parole after a. prisoner has se1·ved 
a part of his se'lttence, shall be credited to the prisoner. Mani-
festly, it refers only to what credit shall be allo,ved for in-
carceration in jail or elsewhere while awaiting trial or pend-
ing the determination of an appeal before the prisoner ha~ 
actttally sta1·ted serving his sentence. 
If the language prohibiting the allowance of credit for 
time not actually spent in confinement had been included in 
Section 5017 (the section dealing with deductions for good 
conduct), or, had such language occurred in a separate sec-
tion dealing with pardons, or paroles, or dealing with the 
subject of 'vhen a sentence shall be considered as having been 
completed, it would then have a direct application to Wright's 
case, but, as pointed out above, since the section, on which 
the Superintendent undoubtedly relied, applies only to credits 
accruing before the prisoner actually starts serving his. sen-
tence in the Penitentiary, it is submitted that the Superin-
tendent's action in refusing credit to Wright is based upon a11 
erroneous understanding of the application of this statute. 
In the absence of languagje showing such intention oi· 
the condition of a commutation ·will not be held to extend be-
yond the period of the sentence. Corpus Juris, Volume 46, 
page 1200; tVilliantS vs. Brents, 171 Ark. 367, 284 S. W. 56. 
Where a convict has complied with the terms of his conviction 
during that period he cannot thereafter be re-arrested. Cor-
pus Juris, Volume 46, page 1200; TVillia1ns vs. B1·ents, 171 
Ark. 367, 284 S. W. 56. · 
The conditions of a pardon Inay be such as to be operative 
for the period of time for which the convict was sentenced or 
for some less period. Crooks vs. Sanders, 123 S. C. 28, 115 
S. E. 760. In so1ne jurisdictions it is held that no conditions 
can be attached to a pardon that a.re to extend after the 
expiration of the term for which the prisoner was sentenced. 
Ex Parte P1·out, 12 Idaho 494, 86 Pac. 275. Under a statute 
wheh provides that in computing the terms of the prisoner's 
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confinement, the time between a conditional pardon and a 
subsequent arrest shall be taken to be a part thereof, ac· 
cused cannot, on breach of the condition of pardon, be impris-
oned under his first sentence after the date 'vhen it would 
have expired, had he not been pardoned In Re: West, 111 
~fass. 443. 
Due to the fact that Enoch Wright was convicted in 1903 
and under .then existing laws of the State of Virginia, 'he was 
entitled to four days a month allow·ance off of his sentence for 
good behavior and due to the fact tha.t he is now being re-
strained and kept in custody of the warden of the Virginia 
State Penitentiary for the remaining period of his sentence 
from February 1, 1910, to the date that he would have been 
originally freed in 19l8, he is entitled as well as any and all 
convicts who are no'v serving sentences in the ,Virginia State 
Penitentiary, to fifteen days a month allowance of time oft 
from an orig·inal sentence by virtue of an act amending and 
re-enacting Section 5017 of the Code of Virginia, as amended, 
relating to record to be kept of conduct of convicts; to have 
c.redit for good conduct; record of punishment,. etc., of con-
victs; inspection of same. Approved 1\farch 11, 1932, Acts of 
Assembly of Virginia, 1932, page 152. This act reads as 
follo,vs: 
'' 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of Virginia, 
That section fifty hundred and seventeen of the Code of ;vir-
g·inia, as anwnded, be an1ended and re~enacted so as to read 
as follows: 
Section 5017. The superintendent of the penitentiary shall 
keep a record of the conduct of ea.ch convict and jail pris-
oner under his control 'vhenever confined, and for every 
month that such convict or jail prisoner 'vherever confined ap-
pears by su~h record to have faithfully observed the rules and 
reg·ulations of the prison, and not to have been subjected to 
punishment, there shall, with the consent of the governor, 
be deducted from the term of service of such convict fifteen 
days . .Such good conduct allowance shall ·commence only on 
the date the prisoner is received in the penitentiary, or the 
convict road force camp. And in addition thereto, each pris-
oner shall be ano,ved a. good conduct credit of fifteen days per 
month for each month actually served by him in jail after 
sentence and 'vhile awaiting removal to the penitentiary or 
the convict road force. But no sueh good conduct allowance 
for time served in ja.il shall be allowed when it appears from 
the certificate of the jailor that said prisoner 'vas guilty of 
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violating the rules of the jail 'vhile confined therein, or sub-
jected to discipline for violation of the same. For any vio-
lation of prison rules punishable by stripes or for escapes or 
attempted escape from custody, the convict or said jail pris· 
oner found guilty of sucl1 violation, or of such escape or at-
tempted escape, shall forfeit for the first offense twenty per 
centum of the tirne that has accumulated to his credit, or 
as much of the said twenty per centum as the superintend-
ent of the penitentiary may determine, and in mtse of con-
tinued misconduct or violations of the rules and regulations, 
he shall forfeit all of his accumulated time. Provided, that 
any such prisoner losing his tin1e, may, by good behavior for 
one year, be restored to his former class or grade, and at the 
discretion of the superintendent, have his time or any part 
thereof credited to him again, and this provision shall ap-
ply to any prisoner now in the penitentiary who has I1ereto-
fore forfeited the time to his credit. Every time any con-
vict or member of the State convict road force is punished, 
the name of the offender, tl1e offense, a full and detailed de-
scription of the punish1nnet, the time when the offense wa~ 
committed, ,and when punish1nent inflicted, shall be recorded 
in a register or reg·isters provided for the purpose. Said reg-
ister or registers shall be monthly inspected by the board of 
directors of the penitenia.ry and reported bi-ennially to the 
general assembly. The provisions of this act shall not apply 
to any person convicted of a misdemeanor or of a felony 
\Vhose · sentence is not more tl1an one year, such person as 
above set forth shall receive for good conduct, a reduction of 
ten days per month.'' 
For consideration of the above statute and other points 
involved herewith is stated the consent rules of the Governor 
of tl1e State of Virginia: 
''The consent rules of the Governor were addressed to the 
Honorable Rice lvi. Youell, Superintendent of the State Peni-
tentiary, on the 14tll day ~f March, 1932, and are as foiiows: 
The 1932 General Assembly amended Section 5017 of the 
Code of Virginia so as to give c.ertain prisoners fifteen lays 
per month off for good behavior in the case of felons in tl1~ 
prison system under the control of the !State Prison Board, 
'vith the consent of the Governor. I hereby give .. n1y consent 
for this to apply to all inmates except the follo,ving: 
1. Those w·ho have been in tl1e Penitentiary for one sen-
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tence and have been regularly discharged, and again convicted 
and sentenced to the Penitentiary. 
2. Those felons who have been granted a conditional par-
don and returned for violating san1e. 
3. Those felons \vho have been convicted of a crime that 
was committed while they were serving sentence in the prison 
system. 
4. Those felons who have escaped or attempted to escape 
\vhile in the custody of the Prison Board, or while in jail 
~waiting trial or removal to the prison systern under the 
control of the State Prison Board. 
For these included in the above excepted classes, I hereby 
give my consent for thmn to earn ten days good conduct time 
per month, as allowed under :Section 5017 before it was 
amended by the General Assembly of 1932. 
JOHN GARLAND POLL~ARD, 
Governor of Yirginia. '' . 
The aforementioned act is retroactive to a person serving 
a. sentence in the v·irginia State Penitentiary at the time the 
amendment was passed and fron1 the time it \vas to take ef-
fect and the consent of the Governor of the State of Vir-
ginia is necessary for any convict to be entitled to fifteen days 
allowance off per n1onth for good behavior and ·said allow-
ance of fifeen days should be computed from the date the 
prisoner was received in ~the penitentiary, no matter when or 
V{here he is in1prisoned in the state. 
It is contended that the petitioner is not entitled to an 
allowanc€ of any good behavior time off during the time that 
he was free and at liberty under conditional pardon. This is 
a fallacy for the reason that while he was at liberty, he was 
still serving his sentence and as his good behavior for the 
period of his sentence was one of the conditions under which 
his liberty was gained, he is entitled to an allowance of same 
for the length of tin1e that his g-ood behavior record was 
good. For that reason he is not only entitled to the four days 
allowance per month which statute was in -effect in 1903, but is 
entitled under Section 5017 of the Virginia Code, as amended, 
to fifteen days on the .first sentence for which he is now be-
ing held in the penitentiary. In other words, fifteen days al-
lowance off for go?d behaivior is allowed to first comers~ but 
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the question is whether or not persons already confined in 
the penitentiary for first sentences, are to benefit by same. 
This question is answered by considering as to whom this act 
applies. It applies to convicts and their terms of service and 
is retroactive. E,or the purpose of construing the act, the 
Governor's consent rules are hereinbefore mentioned in or-
der that they may be read in conjuction with the act. Should 
it be decided that Enoch \Vright is entitled to a fifteen day 
allowance for good behavior, henceforth, and for the time that 
he was at liberty under his conditioual pardon .,vhich wa-s 
twelve years, then Wright is entitled to his freedom imme-
diately. Not only is Enoch vVright entitled to fifteen days 
allowance off of his sentence for g·ood behavior, but any and 
all prisoners ·who are serving a first sentence who live up to 
the provisions outlined in the Governor's ''Consent Rules'', 
are entitled to same. 
THE LA "\VAS TO CONCUR.RENT SERVICE OF TIME AS 
SEPARATE OFFENSES IS CLEAR. 
Counsel for the petitioner believes that counsel for the Com-
monwealth 'vill adn1it that the question of concurrent terms 
of service is a strong· possibility and that Enoc.h Wright might 
be entitled to his freedom under the theory that at the time 
he was serving his sentence under his second conviction, the 
time would count on his first sentence. · 
The case of Ex Parte Black, a North Carolina case, 78 S. 
E., p. 273, is particularly valuable in the consideration of 
the case at bar in that the facts therein are very similar. That 
case ho1ds that a sentence of imprisonment may be given on 
each successive conviction of the accused, and each successive 
terrn may comn1ence on the expiration of the term next pro-
ceeding; but the latter sentence must state that the term shall 
begin at the expiration of the former sentence or the sen-
tences will run concurrently. It further holds that where an 
accused person convicted of crime while at large under a con-
ditional pardon, appeared personally in c.ourt, and withdrew 
his appeal and submitted hhnself to the sentence, not stating 
that it should begin at the expiration of the prior sentence and 
the conditional pardon was revoked and he was taken into 
custody, the two sentences ran concurrently, though the court 
failed to enter on its records the withdrawal of the appeal. 
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Due to the fact that the Black case is so very much similar 
to the one at bar, counsel for the petitioner quotes it almost 
in its entirety. The proceedings followed were those of a 
Habeas Co,rpus proceedings which \vere insituted by W. P. 
Black for his discharge frmn imprisonment. Upon the denial 
of the vVrit he appealed the case, and the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina, reversed the judg1nent of the lower court 
and discharged the petitioner. Now follows the opinion of 
the court in its entirety: 
·"Brown, J. The petitioner, Black, was brought before the 
judge in obedience to a writ of habeas corp~c,.s by the sheriff 
of Buncombe County, to try the legality of the imprisonment 
of the petitioner, who \vas then in prison by virtue of an order 
made by his honor B. F. Long at the December spec.ial term, 
1912, of the criminal court of Buncombe County. At the 
November term, 1908, of the superior court of Buncombe 
County, the petitioner was found guilty of a nuisance, and 
was sentenced to a t~rm of 22 months on the public roads of 
Buncombe County, from \Vhich judgment he took an appeal 
to the Suprmne Court, and petitioner was taken in execution 
on said judgment on the 2nd day of June, 1909. On the 18th 
day of January, 1910, petitioner was granted a conditional 
pardon. .At the July special term, 1911, and \Vhile petitioner 
was at large by virtue of said conditional pardon, he was 
tried for keeping liquor for sale in Buncombe County, was 
convicted, and sentenced to a term of 12 months on the public 
roads of said county, from \Vhich judgment he gave due no-
tice of appeal to the Supreme Court, and entered into the ap-
pearance bond required by the court pending such appeal, was 
released fron1 custody~ but the petitioner did not prosecute 
the appeal. On the 4th day of August, 1911, petitioner was 
taken in custody upon the Governor's revocation of the con-
ditional pardon aforesaid, and entered upon the service of 
the remainder of his said original term of 22 months. At the 
criminal term of superior court of Buncombe county 'vhich 
convened on the 14th day of .August, 1911, petitioner appeared 
in open court and gave due notice of the 'vithdrawal of his 
appeal from the last conviction aforesaid and announced his 
readiness to serve the terms imposed upon said conviction; 
}Jetitioner being a.t the time in custody and serving the sen-
tence in the other case. The presiding- judge had no entry 
1nade on the docket of August term, 1911, ·of the withdra-wal 
of the appeal and of the submission of the prisoner to the 
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judgment and sentence rendered at July special term. It is 
· admitted and the judge finds as a fact that, if the sentence in 
the two cases runs concurrently, the prisoner has served the 
full term in both cases. 
(1) It seems to be well settled by many decisions and with 
entire uniformity that, 'vhere a defendant is sentenced to im-
prisonment on two or more indic.tments on which he has been 
found guilty, sentence may be given against him on each suc-
cessive conviction; in the case of the sentence of imprisonment 
each successive term to commence fron1 the expiration of the 
term next preceding·. It cannot be urged against a. sentence 
of this kind that it is void for uncertainty; it is a.s certain 
as the nature of rt:he matter will admit. But the sentence 
must state that the latter terrr1 is to begin at the expiration of 
the former one; otherwise it will run concurrently with ·it. 
Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law: (2d Ed), vol. 25, pp. 307, 308. It is 
absolutely essential that the last sentence .shaH state that the 
term of imprisonment is to beg·in a. expiration of former sen-
tence in order to prevent the prisoner from serving the two 
sentences concurrently 'vith each other. U. 8. vs. Patterson 
(C. C.), 29 Feel. 77 5 ; In 1·e Jackson, 3 J\Iac.Arthur (D. G.), 24; 
Fortson vs. Elbert County, 117 Ga. 149, 43 S. E. 492 (1903); 
Ex parte Ga.fford, 25 Nev. 101, 57 Pac. 484, 83 Am. St. Rep. 
568; E'x parte Ilunt, 28 Tex . .App. ·361, 13 8. W. 145. 
(2) The fact that no entry was made on the records of the 
court at .August term of the withdrawal of the appeal is imma-
terial. It is found as a fact tha.t the prisoner appeared in 
court in person at said te~·n1 and through his counsel withdrew 
his appeal and submitted himself to the sentence of the court. 
It was the duty of the judge to have then directed the proper 
entries. The prisoner had no control over the records and 
did all the la.w required of him. The oversight of the judge 
cannot prejudice the prisoner's rights.'' 
In Indiana, where a person was sentenced on two separate 
indic.tntents to imprisonment in the State Prison, for two yea.r::<-
on each-the term of in1prisonment on the second charge to 
commence at the expiration of the term on the first-it was 
held that as there 'vas no statute in force providing that one 
term of imprisonment should commence at the expiration of 
another, both terms ~ommenced and elapsed concurrently See 
Miller vs. Alle·n. 11 Ind. 389·. "\Vhere a prisoner 'vas found 
guilty by a verdict on two indictmenJts for separate felonies 
and vthich punisl1ment ,,ras assessed in each case to confine-
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ment in the penitentiary for a period of five years, the court 
entered the following judgment. 
''It is considered by the court tha.t the prisoner be confined 
in the jail and penitentiary house of this Commonwealth, to 
hard labor for the space of five years on each indictment.'' 
"It was determined by the court that the legal effect of 
the judgment was that the prisoner should be confined for five 
years only; that such confinement should be on each indict-
ment, and that both terms of five years should commence and 
terminate simultaneously. See Jones vs. Ward, 2 Mete. Ky. 
271. In the case of Ex Parte George lJ!leyers, 44 J\lfo. 279, 
the syllabus states: · · 
''And 'Yhere a prisoner was sentenced at the }larch term, 
1866, of the St. Louis Criminal Court, to imprisonment for 
two years for grand larceny, and at the l\{ay term of the same 
court, he was aga.in convicted and sentenced on another in-
dictment for g-rand larceny for a period of. three years, he will 
be entitled to his discharg·e at the expiration of three years.'' 
In that case the prisoner was twice found guilty and sen-
tenced on each findings a.t different terms. The Supreme 
Court, in passing upon that case, states: 
''The Court having the power to prescribe the length of" 
time, may sentence the prisoner to several terms in succession 
where he is charged with several offenses, bcause it could in-
flict the same amount of punishment in each case separately. 
But no such practice prevails here. Separate sentences can 
only be passed upon the prisoner in the case in the manner 
pointed out by the statute. There is no provhion anywhere 
made, that I have been ab!e to find, where separate sentences 
can be passed upon a prisoner and he be subjected to more 
than one term of punishment, unless the different convictions 
'vere had at the same term, and both were obtained previous 
to the sentence. But there is no authority for convicting a 
prisoner of a felony at one term of the court and regularly 
passing sentence upon hin1 and then remanding him to jail 
until the next succ.eeding· term and again convicting and sen-
tencing him for another felony. The prisoner has already 
served out more than the length of time prescribed by the 
longest sentence and I think that he is entitled to his dis-
charge.'' 
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In the case of Dickerson vs. Perkins, 182 Iowa 871, cited 
in 5 A. L. R., page 374, the syllabus states: 
'')Sentences by different. courts of one person to imprison-
ment for different offenses which are concurrent in time, run-
concurrently after judgment is so rendered that the impris-
onment upon one shall commence at the expiration of the im-
prisonment of the other, under a statute providing that in case 
of such conviction the judgment may be rendered so that one 
term shall commence at the expiration of the other.'' 
In that case it ·appeared that the accused was sentenced in 
the district court of one county for the maximum term of lar-
ceny and later sentenced in the district court of another 
county for the maximum term for a similar offense. At the 
expiration of the term a petition for Writ of Habeas 'Corpus 
was filed. An Iowa statute relating to cumulative sentences 
follows: 
''If the· defendant is convicted of two or more offenses, the 
punishment of each of which is, or may be imprisoned, the 
judgment may be so rendered that the imprisonment upon 
anyone shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment 
upon any of the other offenses''. 
The above statute is similar to the Virginia Statute. 
The court held that where there is a conviction for the sec-
ond offense which sentence did not provide that the term of inl-
prisonment should begin at the expiration of the first term, 
that the sentence shall run concurrently. It laid down the 
rule that if the judgment be so rendered the statute confers 
no power upon any official to hold the custody of the convict 
beyond the term that appears upon the face of the judgment, 
and that terms of imprisorunent upon separate convictions 
can and not run concurrently. The court went on to say: 
''We think this proposition is recognized in all jurisdic-
tions. The clear implication of the statute is that such terms 
may run concurrently unless the court entered judgment 
· otherwise. In that case the plaintiff was brought from the 
penitentia.ry for the purpose of trial and the court stated that 
it could not see a firm reason of the trial court why it should 
not be presumed to take notice of the fact that he was then 
serving a term upon a previous Qonviction. The convictions 
had were for like offenses. 1The courts "rherein he wao 
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convicted were of co-ordinate jurisdiction. Maximum sen-
tences were imposed. Whether the term of imprisonment im-
posed upon the second conviction should run concurrently 
or not, was a proper matter for the consideration of the court, 
~s bearing upon the character and severity of the punishment, 
and it thought therefore, that a fair construction of the stat~ 
ute requesting the court to hold it applicable and that the 
two sentences imposed upon the plaintiff must be deemed to 
have run concurrently and because the judgment of convic-
tion upon the second offense did not provide that the term 
of imprisonment thereunder should begin at the expiration 
of the term of imprisonment upon the other conviction, the 
terms must be deemed to. have run concurrently.'' 
In the case at bar the accused was tried originally in 1903, 
by the Circuit Court of Wise County and was again tried in 
1922 by the same court on another charge similar to the first. 
The Court had kno,vledge of the previous conviction of 
Wright and the Court knew or had judicial knowledge that 
Wright was out under a conditional pardon, and had it wished 
that vVright was to begin his new sentence at the termination 
of his first term, it would have written the same in the ver-
dict of judgment. It is apparent from the eonsideration of 
the opinion in the case of Fortsen vs. Elbe1·t County, 117 Ga. 
149, 43 S. E. 492, that if one is found guilty ·Of more than one 
offense and the imprisonment under one sentence is to com-
mence at the expiration of the other, the sentence must so state 
or the two punishments would be executed concurrenly. Thls 
was held to be especially true in cases where two or more 
sentences were imposed by the same court. 
The case of Fred Z erbst vs. J oh'l~ LY'man, 255· Fed. 609, and 
c.ited in 5 A. L. R. 357, holds that: 
'Two or more sentences of a conviction to the same place 
of confinement run concurrently in the absence ·of specific pro-
visions in the judgment to the contrary, and that a commit-
ment to imprisonment of one convicted of crime, who is al-
ready serving a sentence, begins at once upon delivery to the 
Warden, so that the second sentence will run concurrently, 
notwithstanding the J\IIarshal, in delivering· the comm.Hment, 
stated that punishment is to be effective upon completion of 
the present term. This case refers to 8 R. L. C., page 242, 
1Section 242. The court in rendering its opinion states in 5 
A. L. R. 358, that : 
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"It c.ould be well assumed that the court intended, if it can 
be assumed, that it had knowledge of the pendency of another 
sentence, that the ordinary effect should follow. Ordinarily, 
two or more sentences run concurrently in the aosence of 
·specific provisions in the judgment to the contrary.;' 
"Where a person is under a sentence for crime and is con-
victed and sentenc-ed for anQther offense, in a different court~ 
the sentences ordinarily are concurrent.'' Ex Parte Green,. 
86 Calif. 427, 25 Pac. 21. 
The cal:)e of 'l'eas..,ey vs. Nelson., 138 S. E., p. 75, holds that:. 
''No presumption will be indulge a in favor of sustaining a 
sentence as cumulative. Accordingly the rule is that wher(} 
the defendant was already in ·execution of a former sentence 
and the second sentence does not state that the term is to be-
gin at the expiration of the former, the second will run con-
currently with.the first in the absence of a statute providing a 
different rule.'' 
16 Corpus Juris, page 1370, states: 
''Conviction for serving a term of imprisonment under a 
prior sentence at the time of a second conviction, sentence may 
be pronounced to begin at tl1e expiration of the term he is 
serving even through tl1e prior sentence was imposed by an-
other and different court in the state. In ·some jurisdictions, 
however, it is held, that cumulative sentences cannot be im-
posed except where they are expressly authorized by statute. 
See Ex Parte M cOuire, 135 Calif. 339, 67 Pac. 327; Ex Parte 
Morton, 64 Pac. 469 ; J( enedy vs. Howard, 7 4 Ind., page 87 ; 
Jam.es vs. Ward, 2 lVIetc. 271 (a l{y. case); Prince vs. State? 
44 Texas 480 
The case of Ex Pa.rte David La1nar, 24 A. L. R., page 864, 
holds that: ''To make a sentence to imprisonment, upon con-
viction upon a second offense of one already serving a prison 
term, commence at the expiration of the pending tenn, the 
language of the sentence must be definite and certain." It 
also holds that: ''A sentence of one serving· a term in prison, 
upon conviction of a second offense, is sufficiently definite to 
make the terms Ruccessive, \Vhere an appended extract from 
the minutes of the trial states that the sentence is to com-
mence at the expiration of the former one. The sentence, 
upon conviction of a subsequent offense of one already serv-
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ing a sentence of imprisonment for crime, may be made to 
commence at a future date.': !See 8 R. C. L. 242; also note 
in 5 A. L. R. 383. In the case at bar the judg·ment of the .Court 
at the trial for the second conviction of Enoch Wright, does 
not state that its term of sentence should 'begin at the expira-
tion of the former term. 
The Judge, in. his opinion, says: 
"Where a defendant is already in execution of a former 
sentence, and where the second sentence does not state that 
the terms is to beg·in at the expiration of the formP-r, the 
second will run concurrently with the :first in the absence of 
a statute providing a different rule: Ex Parte Gafford, 25 
Nev. 101, 83 Am. St. Rep. 568, 57 Pac. 484; Dickerson vs. Per-
kins, !82 Iowa 871, 5 A. ]J. R. 374, 166 N. W. 293; Ex Parte 
Gree·n, 86 Cal. 427, 25 Pac. 21; Re Breton, 93 1\{e. 39, 74 Am. 
St. Rep. 335, 44 AU. 125; Be Black, 162 N. C. 457, 78 s~ E. 273; 
Kirkrnan vs. lJ1cClaughry (C. C.), 152 Fed. 255. · 
The importance of accuracy in the statement of the terms 
of the sentence is a right which is accorded every defendant. 
lt is of importance to the prisoner that the sentence should 
be definite and certain, so as to advise him and the office-r 
charged with its exec.ution of the time of its commencement 
and termination, without being required to inspect the records 
of the court or records of another case. If it is vague and in-
definite, the terms will run concurrently. A sentence to con-
finement to take effect in the future cannot be sustained, un-
less it is certain and definite, and not subject to undefined or 
uncertain contingencies. Indefiniteness and uncertainty leave 
the defendant in a pof-iition where he can claim that he has 
served his sentence. It places him in the position where, if 
it is held th3:t the sentences run concurrently, he may be held 
to have served but one of the two sentences imposed. A 
prisoner, ,v·hile suffering the penalty of the law, should al-
ways have preserved to him whatever remains of his rights 
and condition. A sentence should be so complete as to need 
no construction of a court to ascertain its import. It should 
be so complete that to ascertain its meaning it will not be 
necessary to supplement the written words by either a non-
judicial or ministerial officer. He must find what the sen-
tencing judge intended from the language which he used. 
The rascality of the petitioner, or the merits or demerits of 
his case, or the appropriate punishment 'vhich has been in-
flcted cannot enter into this determination. The punishment 
'vhich the 'vorst criminal has inflicted upon him must be le-
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gal, and when this is not so, however unintentional, an offense 
is being committed in the name of the law against the per~ 
son. Society does not wish to have it imposed; for, if this 
may 1be done against a man guilty of one crime, it can be 
done against another, and no one can say whose turn will 
come next." Ex Parte David Lama-r, 24 A. L. R., pages 879-
880. 
The Lamar case is similar to the case at' bar, in that he 
had been convicted and had begun the service of the sentence 
imposed, but later he was released on bail pending his appeal 
from this conviction he committed another felony for which 
he was sentenced to one year. The distinguishing thing about 
the judgments or verdicts in the two cases is that in the Lamar 
case the appended extract from the minutes of the trial stated 
that the second sentence was to commence a the expiration 
of the former one, but in the case at bar no mention is made 
as to the fact that the sentence should commence at the ex-
piration of the·former one and for that reason Enoch Wright, 
should be entitled to a concurrent service of his two sentences. 
A sentence must state that a latter term is to begin at the 
expirwtion of the former one, otherwise it will run concurrent-
ly with it. Am. & Eng. of Law, Second Editioil, Volume 25, 
page 327 and 308. It is absolutely essential that the last 
sentence shall state that the term of imprisonment is to begin 
at the expiration of the former sentence in order to prevent 
the prisoner from serving the second sentence concurrently 
with each other. U. 8. vs. Patterson, 29 Fed. 775; In Re-. 
Jackson, 3 Mac Arthur (D. C.) 24; Fortson vs. Elbert County, 
117 Ga. 149, 43 iS. E. 492; Ex Parte Gafford, 25 Nev. 101, 57 
Pac .. 484, 83 Am. St. Rep. 568; Ex Parte Hunt, 28 Texas 
App. 361, 1·3 S. \V. 145. Counsel calls attention of the court 
at this time to the fact that Enoch Wright was. convicted of 
two separate offenses, at two separate periods of time, in 
the same county (Wise County, Virginia). 
In Volume 16 Corpus Juris, Section 3237, page 137 4, con-
sideration is given to cumulative sentences in general, as fol-
lows: · 
''In the absence of a statute to the contrary, if it is not 
stated in either of two or more sentences imposed at the same 
time that the imprisonment under any one of them shall take 
effect ·at the expiration of the ·others; the periods of time 
named will run concurrently and the punishments will be 
executed simultaneously. The fact that the terms of impris-
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onment are to be successive must be clearly and expressly , 
stated. This rule is. not changed by a statute which pro-
vides that, where a person is convicted of two or more of-
fenses at the same time, the imprisonment upon the second 
~ conviction shall commence at the termination of the impris-
onment upon prior conviction. Likewise, a statute which 
provides that on conviction of larceny in connection with 
burglary certain punishment 'in addition to' that authorized 
for burglary may be imposed does not serve to amalgamate 
the two offenses into a single term, nor does it relate to the 
beginning and ending of the terms of imprisonment, and on 
conviction of both offenses, in the absence of a specific direc-
tion that sentence for each offense shall operate successively, 
the terms t~erein specified will run concurrently. Where, 
however, different sentences are imposed by different courts, 
the rule as to sentences operating concurrently unless other-
wise dire·cted in the sentence does not apply. Under a stat-
ute which provides that the term of imprisonment shall com-
mence from the .day of sentence, where defendant is sen-
tenced to hnprisonment, while serving a term under a previ-
ous sentence, his term under the two sentences will run con-
currently from the day the second is pronounced.'·' 
Where a defendant is found guilty of more than one of-
fense, and the imprisonment under one sentence is to com-
mence at the expiration of the other, the sentence must so 
state, else the second punishment will be executed concur-
rently. Fortson vs. FJ,!bert Cottnty, 43 S. E. 492, 117 Ga. 149; 
Sha;mblin vs. Penn (Ga. case), 97 S. E. 520; Sullivan vs. 
Clarke, 119 S. E·. 913, 156 Ga. 706. "Where several sentences 
are imposed for separate and distin~t offenses, after con-
viction thereof on separate indictments or on several counts 
in the indictment, the sentences run concurrently unless the 
intention that it should ~begin at the end of the other is ex-
pressed. St. vs. Mac Keller, 63 E. P. 314 (aS. C. case). See 
criminal la'v Cent. Dig., Section 3298, 3301 Dec. Dig., Section 
1210. . 
Section 4786 of the Virginia Code provides that in convic-
tions for two or more offenses, confinement is to· commence 
after previous term expires-' 'When any person is convieted 
of two or more offenses, before sentence is pronounced for 
either, the confinement to which he may be sentenced upon the 
second, or any subsequent convietion, shall commence at the 
termination of the previous term or terms of confinement''. 
Aside from the statute, the authorities seem to hold without 
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dissent, that subsequent sentences run concurrently with the 
first sentence unless it is specified in the subsequent judg-
ment or judgments, that such subsequent term or terms are • 
to be served after the completion of a prior term or terms. 
In 8 ~- C. L., p. 242, section 242, it is said: 
"It is familiar practice that wherever the court imposing 
Reveral sentences desires to have one begin on the expiration 
of another, that fact is expressly stated in the sentence; and 
whenever the court inadvertently fails. to have the sentence 
recorded in that form, or from leniency intentionally omits 
to add such a provision, and the defendant is committed in 
pursuance of such sentences, he is either voluntarily released 
~y the jailor, or discharged on habeas corp~M at the expiration 
of the longest tenn named in either of the sentences. No 
presumption will be indulged in favor of sustaining the sen-
tence as cumulative. According·ly, the rule is that where the 
defendant is already in execution on a former sentence, and 
the second sentence does not state that the term is to begin 
.at the expiration of the former, the second 'viii run concur-
rently with the first, in the absence of a statute providing a 
different rule; but when the different sentences are imposed 
by different courts it seems that it is not necessary that the 
sentence should state that the second term is to begin at th~ 
expiration of the first''. 
See also 16 C. ,T. 1307 ; 25 Am. & Eng. ~ncy. of L. 307 ; 
Ex parte Mye1·s, 44 Mo. 279; Ex parte J(·irby, 76 Calif. 514; 
Ex parte Dubin, 102 ::1\fo. 100; In re Brenton, 93 Me. 39, 74 
A. S. R. 335. It would seem that this rule has no application 
to those cases where· the sentences 'vere rendered by dif-
ferent courts, althoug·h Georgia is the only State that appears 
to have passed on this question, hut tl1e rule as laid down by 
the Georgia court is stated as being the rule in the above-
quoted section of Ruling Case Law. 
In a case where all of the sentences 'vere given at the same 
terms of the court it is our opinion that section 4786 of the 
Code would apply. This section reads as follows: 
''When any person is convicted of two or more offenses1 
before sentence is pronounced for either, the confinement to 
whicl1 he may be sentenced upon the se-cond, or any subsequent 
conviction, shall commence at the termination of the previ-
ous term or terms of con:finmnent. '' 
· A similar statute was so construed by the Supreme Court 
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of 1\fissouri in Ex lJarte ~Iyers, 44, Mo. 2·79 (1869). It also 
calls your attention to SulJ..'ivan vs. ·Clarke, 156 Ga. 706 (1923), 
and Ex parte Kl,uge, 128 S. E. (.S. C.) 882, 886 (1925) ". 
We think that the counsel for the Comtnonwealth will state 
that the State of Virginia hitherto, previous to the case at 
bar, has concurred with this theory that the two sentences 
wo.uld run concurrently, but makes a distinction in the case 
at bar, because of the fact tha.t the petitioner was at liberty 
unde a conditional pardon at the time he committed the act 
for which he 'vas convicted the second time. 
Due to the fact that the costs of maintaining criminals has 
increased lately, in the past five years, and due to the fact 
that the prisoner, Enoch Wright, has spent approximately 
twenty years in the State Penitentiary of Virginia, and due 
to the fact that' he has been granted a commutation of one 
sentence by one Governor of .Virginia and a conditional par-
don by the act of another Governor of Virginia, and that 
during the time for which he was sentenced originally re-
maining to be served at the time he 'vas conditionally par-
doned in 1910, the behavior and conduct of the prisoner was 
excellent and he lived up to the requirements of the pardon, 
during the time for 'vhich he 'vas sentenced to the peniten-
tiary and he feels that anything taking place approximately 
four years after the da.te that he would have been released 
from the penitentiary under his :first sentence, . should not 
apply against him; and due to the fact that at the time of 
his second conviction,. the sentence did not provide that his 
second period of oon:finement should begin from the expiration 
of his first sentence, then if the prisoner should not be al-
lowed the time off for good behavior while he was out of tho 
prison on a conditional pardon and credited 'vith the time 
he ·was ~t liberty and did not violate his pardon, and further 
due to the fact that his first sentence ran concurrently 'vith 
his second sentence 'vould therefore be entitled to his free-
dom. So the prisoner, by and through his counsel, contends 
that under the strictest ruling of the court under any and 
all theories advanced by the prisoner, he is entitled to his 
freedom. 
In conclusion, counsel for the petitioner ''tishes to advise 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, that it has pre-
sented a copy of his petition and a copy of the Transcript of 
Record to the Attorney General's Office, of the .State of Vir-
ginia; that counsel for the petitioner desires to present his 
petition orally; and that he adopts this petition as his opening 
brief. 
It is respectfully submitted that upon the whole case a 
. . ' 
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Writ of Error should be g-ranted and a Suversedeas, to the 
judgment of the lower Court; that the said judg-ment should 
be set aside and the defendant discharged by this Court. And 
pet1tioner will ever pray. 
RAI.~PH C. BETHEL, 
Attorney for the petitioner. 
ENOCH WRIGHT, 
By Counsel. 
I, the undersig-ned attorney at law, practicing in .the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, hereby certify that I 
have carefully examined the foregoing petition and tran-
script of the record herewith presented and in my opinion a 
judg·ment, sentence, and verdict should be reviewed by this 
Honorable Court. 
M. J. FULTON, 
Attorney at Law. 
I, Ralph C. Bethel, attorney for the petitioner in the fore .. 
going case, hereby certify that I have mailed a complete and 
exact copy of the foregoing petition to the Honorable Major 
Gibson, Attorney for the Commonwealth on the 28th day of 
January, 19·33, with notice that the petition 'vould be filed in 
the office with the Clerk of the 'Supreme Court on February 
2nd, 19·33, to be by him, presented to the Court. 
RALPH C. BETHEL, 
Attorney for the petitioner. 
To the Honorable Niajor Gibson,. 
Attorney General's Office, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Dear Sir: 
I, Ra.lph C. Bethel, attorney of ·the petitioner in the fore-
going case, here·with tenders you a copy of his petition on be-
half of Enoch Wright, with notice that the petition will be filed 
in the office of the Supreme Court of Virginia, on the 2nd 
day of February, 1933, and to be presented ·by ihe Clerk to 
the Court. 
RALPH c I BETHEL, 
Attorney of Petitioner. 
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Legal and timely service of this notice is hereby accepted. 
Feb. 2, 1933, filed. 
EDWIN H. GIBSON, 
Office of the Attorney General of the 
State of Virginia. 
LOUI·S .S. EPES. 
Feb. 7, 1933, writ of error allowed. Bond $100.00. 
LOUIS S. EPES. 
Rec'd Feby. 7/33. 
H. S. J. 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Enoch Wright 
vs. 
Rice J\L Youell, Superintendent of the State Penitentiary of 
Virginia. 
TR.ANSCRIPT OF RECORD IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
OF THE CITY OF RICHl\tiOND. 
A copy of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in 
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, by Enoch Wright. 
:Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Enoch Wright 
vs. 
Rice J\[ Youell, Superintendent of the State Penitentiary of 
Virginia. 
PETITION :@OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 
To the Honorable Julien Gunn, Judge of said Court: 
Your petitioner, Enoch Wright, respectfully shows unto 
Your Honor that he is unlawfully imprisoned, detained, con-
fined, and restrained of his liberty by Rice M. Youell, Super-
intendent of State Penitentiary of Virginia, in the City of 
Richmond, Virginia; and that the imprisonment, detention, 
I. 
I 
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confinement, and restraint are illegal, and that the illegality 
thereof consists in this, to-wit: 
That the only pretext or cause of such imprisonment and 
detention, confinement and restraint is ·by virtue of a judg-
ment of the Circuit Court of Wise .County, Virginia, entered 
in February, 1903, under which your petitioner was sentenced 
to serve seventeen (17) years in the penitentiary; that by 
virtue of the laws of Virginia, in force and effect at the time 
the said sentenee was pronounced and at the time your peti-
tioner began to serve his imprisonment thereunder, your pe-
titioner was entitled to a deduction of ten days out of each 
thirty days as an allowance for good behavior, and that con-
sequently, with good behavior, the term of seventeen (17) 
years would expire in eleven (11} years and three (3) months 
from the time of its commencement; that your petitioner en-
tered the S.tate Penitentiary of Virginia and began to serve 
his sentence in the year of 1903, and that, in accordance 
with the records a.nd computation of the Superintendent of 
the State Penitentiary of Virginia, the said seventeen (17} 
year term of imprisonment 'vas calculated to expire 
page 2 ~ in the year of 1918. 
Your petitioner's demand for release has been re-
fus,ed by the ·said Superintendent of the State Penitentiary 
of Virginia, who assigns as his reason that your petitioner 
was released from the said Penitentiary February 10, 1910, 
by virtue of a conditional pardon issued by the then Gover-
nor of ~Virginia, Honorable Claude A. .Swanson, and that 
the said conditional pardon was thereafter revoked, April 
13, 1922, and your petitioner returned to the Penitentiary in 
1922; and consequently the s~aid Superintendent claims that 
your petitioner is not entitled to be credited with the time 
elapsing between his release on conditional pardon and his 
return to the Penitentiary upon the revocation of said par-
don. 
Copy of said pardon, reciting the original conviction of 
your petitioner, and containing in full the conditions annexed 
·to said pardon, is hereto attached, marked ''Exhibit A'', and 
prayed to be taken and read as part of this petition. 
Your petitioner claims that he is entiled to credit on his 
term of imprisonment for the time that elapsed between the 
date of his conditional pardon and its revocation as aforesaid; 
and consequently that his sentence has been now fully served 
in accordance with the laws of Virginia, and that his term 
of imprisonment thereunder has now expired, and conse-
quently that he is entitled to his liberty on the following 
basis:-
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(1) Under the terms of the conditional pardon, there was 
expressly reserved ''the right to the Governor of Virginia to 
revoke this pardon at any time''. By this condition, it is 
clear that your petitioner was not released from the custody 
of the law and that the operation of the sentence was not 
suspended and that, without any ~muse, without any hearing, 
\vithont any right to protest,-without any say \vhatsoever on 
the part of your petitioner, he was, during the entire time 
of the disputed period (from the date of the con-
page 3 ~ ditional pardon release until the date of his return 
on revocation) in the shadow of the possibility of 
this revocation ; 
(2) Another condition of the said pardon provided that the 
said pa.rdon be null and void if ever again your petitioner 
''be found guilty of a violation of the penal laws of the Com-
monwealth". Unless the tin1e during \Vhich your petitioner 
\vas enjoying this conditional pardon or parole, is to be 
counted as a part of his term of imprisonment, this condi-
tion, in effect, \voulcl make your petitioner subject not only 
to \vhatever punishment the Court might inflict for his "vio-
lation of the penal laws of the Commonwealth", but also the 
punishment of serving additional imprisonment under his 
original sentenee. The Governor, as the head of the Execu-
tive Department of the government, has power, it is submit-
ted to extend clemency and reduce punishment, but he has 
no power to do anything which either directly or indirectly 
increases or broadens punishment; 
(3) On April 13, 1922, after having been previously ar-
rested, your petitioner, was tried in the Circuit Court of Wise 
County, Virginia, on a new charge and sentenced to twelve 
(12) years in the State Penitentiary. He was returned to 
the State Penitentiary of Virginia, immediately. Under this 
new sentence begim1ing with April 13, 1922 for twelve 
(12) years, with time off for good behavior, he would have 
completed his sentence in exactly eight (8) years from that 
date, which would be completed on A~ril 13, 1930. 
page 4 ~ For this second confinement in the .State Peniten-
tiary of Virginia, although his citizenship papers 
had been restored to him, he was given an additional two 
years by the Circuit Court of the Gity of Ri(fhmond, whi0h 
\vould cause hin1 to serve two .(2) years more from A.prill3, 
1930, to April 13, 1932, less time off for his good behavior; 
so under the la"r his two (2) year sentence· for his second 
conviction had been served and his twelve (12) years under 
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the sentence of April 13, 1922, has been served and there re-
mains only consideration of his first conviction of 1902, for 
seventeen (17) years. This period of time he actually served 
seven (7) years and was pardoned in 1910, by Governor Swan-
son, as mentioned aforesaid, and was fr~e and out in the 
world under the provision~ of this conditional pardon, until 
1922; so under the provisions of his conditional pardon, he 
was out in the world for twelve ( 12) years, during which 
time had he been imprisoned in the penitentiary, his sentence 
would have been completed and should credit be allowed 
your petitioner for the time that he 'vas out of the peniten-
tiary under his conditional pardon, his sentence would still 
be completed. 
Your petitioner further shows unto Your Honor that the 
conduct record of the said Superintendent of the .State Peni-
tentiary of Virginia, shows that your petitioner has faithfully 
observed the rules and regulations of the prison and has not 
been subjected to punishment for such period of time that his 
term of imprisonment expired in 1931, if he it to be credited 
with the period that elapsed as aforesaid between 
page 5 ~ his release on conditional pardon and his return 
to the Penitentiary on the revocation thereof, and 
upon the sentence of his conviction of April 13, 1922, that 
his service of sentence would have been completed. 
Wherefore you petitioner prays that a Writ of habeas co1·-
p~ts and s~~bjicidendu,m may be granted directed to the said 
Rice NL Youell, Superintendent of the S.tate Penitentiary of 
Virginia, commanding him to have the body of this petitioner 
before Your Honorable Court at a time and place therein to 
be specified, together with the time and cause of his denten-
tion, and that your petitioner may be restored to his lib-
erty, and that such other and further and general-relief may 
be granted to your petitioner as to your Honorable Court may 
seem just and meet. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ENOCH WRIGHT, Petitioner. 
RAI.sPH H. C. BETHEL, 
Attorney for the Petitioner. 
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State of ;Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
This day, Enoch Wright the above named petitioner, per-
sonally appeared before me, R-alph C. Bethel, Commissioner 
in Chancery for the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, 
Virginia, and made oath that the matters and things stated 
in the foregoing petition are true to the best of his knowl-
edge and belief. 
Given under my hand this 2nd day of December, 1932. 
. RALPH C. BETHEL, 
Commissioner in Chancery for the Circuit Court 
of the City of Richmond, Va. 
page 6 ~ A copy of the Answer filed in the Circuit Court of 
the City of Riehmond, by the Attorney General's 
Office. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Enoch 'Vright 
vs. 
Rice l\L Youell, Superintendent of the State Penitentiary· of 
' Virginia. 
ANSWER. 
To the Honorable Julien Gunn, Judge of the Circuit Court 
of the City of Richmond: 
Your respondent, Rice M. Youell, Superintendent of the 
State Penitentiary of .Virginia, for answer to the petition of 
of Enoch Wright, a convict now serving a sentence of con-
finement in the State penitentiary, for a writ of habeas cor-
pus and disch~rge from custody, answering, says: 
1. That the said Enoch "\Vrigh t is not, as alleged in the pe-
tition, illegally restrained ·of liberty and confined in the 
State penitentiary, and for grounds of detention and confine-
ment, which he admits, sa.ys: 
2. Tl1at the said Enoch Wright was on the 11th day of Feb-
ruary, 1903, sentenced to seventeen years confinement in the 
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State penitentiary upon his conviction of a felony in the 
county court of Wise County, Virginia. That upon the 20th 
day of January, 1910, the said Enoch Wright was granted a 
conditional pardon by Honorable Claude A. Swanson, then 
Governor of Virginia, and said pardon was duly accepted un-
der his hand by said Enoch Wright, and that a condition of 
said pardon and discharge from confinement was upon the 
term and condition that the said Wright would conflict him-
self as a good la.w-abiding citizen and, if he should ever be 
found g11ilty of a violation of the penal laws of the 
page 7 ~ Commonwealth of Virginia, the pardon granted him 
· should be null and void. 
3. Respondent shows unto the court that afterwards, to-
wit, on the 13th day of April, 1922, the said Enoch Wright 
was again convicted of a felony in the· Circuit Court of Wise 
County, .Virginia, and sentenced on· the ·same day to a term 
of twelve years confinement in the penitentiary, thereby vo-
lating the condition of the pardon granted said Wright by· 
Governor .Swanson. 
4. Petitioner admits that upon the second conviction he 
was indicted for a felony.in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond; and, upon his conviction thereof, ~as sentenced, 
an additional term of two years confinement in the peniten-
tiary. 
5 Respondent shows unto the court that the said Enoc.ll 
Wright was duly conveyed to the penitentiary upon his convic-
tion of a felony in the Circuit Oou1·t of Wise ·County on the 
13th day of April, 1922, and was confined in the penitentiary 
of the State of Virginia for a term provided by law subject to 
time off for good behavior, and in addition thereto to fur-
ther confinement for a period of two years upon his convic-
tion in the Circuit Court of the ·City of Richmond. 
6. That upon the expiration of the service of the two sen-
tences for 'vhich said Wright had been confined,. the provisions 
of the pardon granted by Governor s,vanson having been vio-
lated and he having been found guilty of violation of the 
penal laws of the State of Virginia, and the pardon by its ex-
press terms being null and void, the said Wright is now being 
restrained of his liberty and hel~ in confinement in the State 
penitentiary to serve out the unexpired portion of the sen-
tenc-e imposed on him by the County ·C'ourt of Wise County, 
Virginia, on the l!lth day of February, 1903. 
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7. And now having fully answered and stated the reason 
of the detention and confinement of the said Enoch Wright 
and hav~ng produced him in open court p1;1rsuant. to 
page 8 } order thereof, he prays to be hence dismissed w1th 
his reasonable costs in this behalf expended 
RICE M. YOUELL, 
Superintendent of State Penitentiary of Virginia, 
By Counsel. 
EDWIN H. GIBSON, 
Assistant Atty. General. 
page 9 ~ Virginia : . 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Enoch Wright 
vs. 
Rice ~1:. Youell, Superintendent of the .State Penitentiary of 
Virginia 
CERTIFICATE OF EVIDENCE 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond on 
Wednesday, the 25th day of J annary, 1933. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-:wit, in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Richmond, on Wednesday, the 7th day 
of December, in the year 1932, came Enoch Wright by his 
attorney, and filed his petition, praying for a Writ of Habeas 
Co·rpus against Rice 1\L Youell, Superintendent of the State 
Penitentia.ry of .Virginia, and in pu.rsuant to said Writ, Rice 
M. Youell, Superintendent of said Penitentiary, produced the. 
body of the said Enoch Wrig·ht and the Honorable Edwin H. 
Gibson, Assistant Attorney General, filed the Answer of the 
respondent which petition and answer are as follows: 
page 10 ~ And at another date, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Enoch Wright 
vs. 
Rice ~I. Youell, Superintendent of the Sta.te Penitentiary of 
Virginia. 
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In the Circuit C~urt. of the City of Richmond, Virginia, 
Wednesday, January 25, 1933, there came Ralph C. Bethel, 
attorney for the petitioner, Enoch Wright,. and presented to 
the· .Court for its consideration, the following Exhibits: 
page 11} EXHIBIT ''A''. 
-4, copy of the Judgment of the Wise County Circuit Court, 
of the 30th day of January, 1903. 
:Virginia: 
County of Wise, towit: 
Pleas before the County Court of the County of Wise at the 
Court-house of the said County, on the day of February .. 
1903. 
Be it remembered, That heretofore, towit: at a County 
Court, held for the said County at the court house on the 30th 
day of January, 1903, John Adams Jr., foreman, W. D. Thorn 
ton, John W. Green, Ha.rvey Easterling, 1\L G. Gilly, and B. 
C. Ramey, were sworn a Special Grand Jury of Inquest, in 
and for the body of the County of Wise, and having received 
their charge, were sent out of court, and after some time re-
turned into court with an indictment against Bob. Mullins, 
Enoch Wright, and E. A. Hopson, for felony, which, with 
the endorsement thereon by the Foreman, is as follows: 
Commonwealth of Virginia~ 
County of Wise, to-wit: 
In the .County Court of said County. Tlte Jurors of the 
~Commonwealth of Virginia, in and for the body of the County 
of Wise and now a.ttending the said court, at its Jan. Term, 
1903, upon their oaths present, that Bob Mullins, Enoch 
Wright and E. A. Hopson in the year 1902, in the said County 
of Wise did feloneously, maliciously, unlawfully and of their 
malice aforethought with a certain pistol loaded and charged 
with g·un powder and leaden bullets, shoot one John Salyer in 
and upon the body of him, the said John Slayer giving to him, 
the said John Slayer, with said leaden bullet one mortal wound 
of which mortal wound on the day of 1902, in the said 
County of Wise he the said John Slayer then and there died. 
Against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth. 
Upon t4e evidence of Jasper .Sal yen. 
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Endorsed: A True Bill, John Adams Jr., Foreman, And 
now at this day, to-wit: At a County Court held 
page 12 }- for the said County, at the courthouse, on the 5th 
day ,of Feb. 1903, the said Enoch Wright was led 
to the ~bar, in the custody of the ·Sheriff of this County, and 
being arraigned, pleaded, "Not guilty", and the said Sheriff 
having returned the writ of venir.e facias, together with the 
names of Sixteen persons summoned by him,' and taken from 
the list furnished by the Judge of the court, and a panel of 
sixteen qualified jurors, free from exceptions, being com-
pleted, and the prisoner having stricken from the said pan~I 
four of the said jurors the remaining twelve constituted the 
jury for the trial of the prisoner, to-wit: Crockett, Hamblin, 
J. M. Taylor, W. I. Nickles, I. T. Gilly, W. H. Cornes, F. B. 
Jessee, J. P. 1\!Iullins, J..~. R. Perry, R. E. Kennedy, G. N. 
!{night, K. A. Mann and 0. C. Bill, who were sworn the truth 
of, and upon the premises to speak, and on Feb. lOth, 1903, 
having heard the evidence, retired to consider of their v·erdict, 
and after some time returned into court with a verdict as fol-
lows, towit: "We, the jury, find the defendant, Enoeh Wright, 
guilty of murder in the second degree, as charged in the within. 
indictment, and fix his punishment at seventeen years. con-
finement in the penitentiary, house of this Commonwealth, W. 
H. Cornes, foreman, and thereupon the prisoner was re-
manded to jail. 
And on Feb, 11th, 1903, another day of the Court at the Jan. 
Term, 1903. The prisoner was led to bar in the . custody of 
the Jailor of this County, and after a, motion was made to 
set aside the verdict of the Jury, which was overruled, and 
to which the defendant excepted (For want of space I do not 
insert) it was demanded of him if anything for himself, he 
had or knew to say, why the court should not now proceed to 
pronounce judgment against him according to law:; and ·noth-
ing being offered or allege~ in delay thereof: It it considered 
by the court that the said Enoch Wright, be imprisoned in 
the Penitentiary of this Commonwealth for the term of Seven-
teen years, the period by the jurors in their verdict ascer-
tained. And it is ordered that the Clerk of this 
page 13 ~ Court forthwith transmit to tbe Superintendent 
of the Penitentiary a copy of this judgment, and 
that the Sheriff of this County, when required so to do, deliver 
the said Enoch Wright to the guard authorized to receive 
him, who shall remove and safely convey the said Enoch 
Wright from the jail of this ·County to the said Penitentiary, 
------ -- ---~-~~--
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therein to be kept imprisoned and treated in the manner di-
rected by la,v. And thereupon the said Enoch Wright was re-
manded to jail. 
A Transcript from the Record. 
Teste: 
W. E. l{ILGORN, Clerk. 
By C. A. ,JOHNSON, D. C. 
This case 'vill probably be appealed but no suspension of 
judgment was asked for, hence the deft. was to be sent to the 
penitentiary to a'vait a claim of court of appeals. 
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A copy of a commutation of forty-seven days ( 47) entered 
by Governor A. J. Montague,. on the 22nd day of September, 
1903. 
Common,vealth of N"irginia, 
To all to 'vhom these presents shall come-Greeting: 
WHEREAS, at a County Court held in and for the County 
of Wise, in the month of ],.ebruary, in the year one thousand 
n~ne hundred and three, Enoch Wright, #4794, was con-
victed of murder second degree and "ras thereupon sentenced 
to be imprisoned in the penitentiary for the term of seven-
teen years and whereas it appears to the executive that he 
is fit su;bject for clemency: 
THEREFORE, I, A. J. MONTAGUE, Governor of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, have, by virtue of authority 
vested in me, deduated and do hereby deduct from the said 
sentence forty seven days ( 47) and do order that he be dis-
charged from imprisonment at the expiration of said com-
muted term. 
Given under mv hand and under the Lesser Seal of the 
Commonwealth afRichmond, this 22nd day of September, in 
the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and three, 
0 
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and in the one hundred and twenty eighth year of the Com-
monwealth. 
.A .. J. MONTAGUE. 
. By the Governor : 
D. Q. EGGLESTON, 
Secretary of the Commonwealth. 
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.A copy of a conditional pardon granted by Governor Claude 
A. Swanson on the 29th day of January, 1910. 
Commonwealth of 1Virginia, 
To all to whom these presents shall come-Greeting: 
WHEREA8, at a County Court held in and for the County 
of Wise, in the month of January, in the year one thousand 
· nine hundred and three, Enoch Wright was convicted of 
murder and was thereupon sentenced to be imprisoned in the 
Penitentiary for the term of seventeen years, and whereas it 
appears to the executive that he is a fit subject for clemency, 
THEREFORE, I, CLAUDE A. SWANSON, Governor of 
the Commonwealth of Virginia, have, by virtue of authority 
vested in me, pardoned and do hereby pardon the said Enoch 
Wright, and do order that he be forthwith discharged from 
imprisonment, but upon the terms and conditions following, 
namely: 
That the said Enoch Wrig·ht will conduct himself in the 
future as a g·ood, law-a:bidin~: citnzen; and if ever again he be 
found guilty of a violation of the penal laws of the Oommon-
w·ealth this pardon shall be null and void. 
Given under my hand and under the Lesser 1Seal of the Com-
nlonwealth, at Richmond, this 29th day of January, in the 
year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and ten, and in 
the one hundred and thirty fourth year of the C'ommonwealth. 
CLAUDE A. SWANSON . 
.By the Governor: 
B. 0. JAMES, 
Secretary of the Con1monwealth. 
,...----- -------- ~---
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I, Enoch Wright, hereby accept the above pardon with the 
conditions therein set forth. 
Signed ENOC':& WRIGHT. 
Witness: 
C. DUMBRIOI(, Clerk. 
page 16 ~ EXHIBIT "D". 
A copy of the Judgment of the Wise County Circuit Court, 
entered on the 13th day of April, 1922. 
Virg·inia: 
County of Wise, to-wit: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the County of Wise at 
the court-house of the said County, on the 13th day of April, 
19·22. 
Be it remembered, That heretofore, to,vit: at a Circuit 
Court, held for the said at the court-house, on the 3rd day of 
January, 1921, D. E. Llewellyn, Foreman, D. 0. Dean, T. W. 
Owens, F. B. Kline, Brice Norton and J. T. Hamilton, were 
sworn a special Grand Jury of Inquest, in and for the body 
of the County of Wise and having· received their charg·e, were 
sent out of court, and after some time returned into court with 
an indictment against Enoch Wright for felony, which 'vith 
the endorsement thereon by the Foreman, is as follows: 
Commonwealth of ;virginia, 
County of County of Wise, to-wit: 
In the Oircuit Court of said County. 
· The grand jurors of the -Commonwealth of Virginia, in and 
for the body of the County of Wise and now attending the 
said court at its J a.nuary term in the year 1921, upon their 
oaths present, that Enoch Wright, on the- day of December, 
1920, within year next prior to the finding of this indictment 
in the said county of Wise did unlawfully, feloniously, wil-
Enoch Wright v. R. M. Youell, ~Supt., etc. · 51 
·fully, deliberately, premediately, and of his malice afore-
thought with a certain loaded pistol, shoot one Preston Bent-
ley, thereby giving to him, the said Preston Bentley, in and 
upon the body of him, the said Preston Bentley, one mortal 
wound, of which said mortal would, he, the said Preston Bent-
ley, languished, and langwishing did live from the said day 
of December 1920, to the day of Drecember, 1920, on which 
said day of December, 1920, he, the said Preston Bentl~y, of 
the said mortal wound, in the said County of Wise, died. 
against the peace and dignity of the Cornmon,vealth. 
Upon the evidence of C. vV. Gibson. 
Endorsed : A True Bill, E. L. Llewellyne, Foreman. 
page 17 ~ And now at this day, to-wit: At a Circuit Courf 
held for the said County, at the courthouse, on the 
13th day of April, 1922, Enoch Wright 'vas led to the bar, in 
the custody of the Sheriff of this County, and being arraigned, 
pleaded "not guilty", and the said Sheriff having returned 
the writ of vwnire facias, together with the names of twenty 
four persons summoned by him, and taken from the list fur-
nished by the Clerk of the court, and a panel of twenty quali-
fied jurors, free from exceptions, being completed, and the 
prisoner having stricken from the said panel four of the said 
jurors, the remaining· twelve constituted the jury of the trial 
of the prisoner, to-,vit: A. F. Letts, L. B. Hagy, H. J. Fuller, 
J. N. Burton, Charlie Fuller, W. H. Killer, Lie Hurrnycut, 
Lacy Meador, H. P. Holbrook, B. F. Hopkins, J. T. Evans 
and J. ~L Short 'vho were sworn the truth of, and upon the 
premises to speak, and having heard the evidence, retired to 
consider of their verdict, and after some time returned into 
eourt with a. verdict as follows; to-,vit: "We, the jury, find 
the defendant guilty, of murder in the second degree, and 
.fix his punishment at 12 years in the penitentiary'' of this 
Commonwealth, W. H. Keller, Foreman, and thereupon it be-
ing demanded of him if anything· for himself, he had or knew 
to say, why the court should not no'v proceed to pronounce 
judgment against him according to law; and nothing being of-
fered or alleged in delay thereof: It is considered by the 
court that the said Enoch Wright be imprisoned in the Peni-
tentiary of this Commonwealth for the term of Twelve (12) 
years, the period of the jurors in their verdict ascertained. 
And it is ordered that the Clerk of this Court forthwith trans-
mit to the Superintendent of the Penitentiary a copy of this 
Judgment, and that the .Sheriff of this County, when required 
-- ~~- ---~~~------.,-------
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so to do, deliver the said Enoch Wright to the guard au-
thorized to receive him, who shall remove and safely convey 
the said Enoch Wright from the jail of this County to the said 
Penitentiary, therein to be kept imprisoned and treated in the 
manner directed by Law. And thereupon the. said Enoch 
Wright was remanded to jaiL 
A transcript from the Record. 
Teste: 
R. R. ROBERTIS, Clerk,. 
By 0. A. JOHNSON, D. C. 
page 18 ~- EXHIB[T '']{]'".A PRISON RECORD OF 
ENOCH WRIGHT. 
PRISON RECORD. 
Dec. 6, 193. 
Name-ENOCH Wright, Number-18112-Race White, 
Alias-:N'"one, Committed-May 26, 1922, Age-54, Married, 
Farmer, Court-Wise County, Date-Apr. 1922, Crime-
~{urder, 2nd deg., ~rerm-12 years, Balance left from first 
term, six yrs. 3 mos. 11 days. Added for escape None Added 
for Second Conviction 2 yea1·s. T~otal Term 20 yrs, 3 mos. 
11 ds. years served 10 Years 7 ~Ionths 23 Days 43 days jail 
time included. T-erm Expires January 1, 1938. 
PRISON RULES VIOLATED. 
1st. conv. #4794, Enoch Wright, Com. Apr. 16, 1903, Wise 
County, Murder, 2nd deg. 17 yrs. Con. Pardon, Feb. 1, 1910. 
This man's fourteen year sentence which includes the twelve 
years for murder, and two years for 2nd conviction, expired 
Sept. 21, 1931, but we added the 6 yrs. 3 mos. 11 days, which 
is the balance of the first sentence he had to serve after vio-
lating his pardon. · 
page 19 ~ On consideration of the Exhibits and argument 
. of counsel, . for the petitioner, and the Attorney 
:General's Office, the Court entered the following judgment: 
page 20.r A copy of the judgment of the Circ-uit Court of 
the City of Richmond. 
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And at another day, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Enoch Wright 
vs. 
Rice M. Youell, .Superintendent of the State Penitentiary of 
Virginia. 
JUDGMENT. 
Enoch Wright, having been brought before this Court by the 
Sheriff of this City, in obedience to the Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus ad subjiciendum heretofore awarded herein, and the de-
fendant having presented and file~ his Answer to the Petition 
filed herein, and the matter having been fully argued, the 
Court took the matters herein involved under consideration. 
Accordingly, the ·Court is of opinion that the petitioner is 
not entitled to his freedom and that he is not illegally being 
restrained of his liberty by Rice M. Youell, .Superintendent of 
the State Penitentiary of :Virginia, and therefore the Court 
doth Adjudge, Order and Decree that the petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus be denied Enoch Wright. 
page 21 ~ Attorney for the petitioner then excepted to the 
ruling of the ·Court and filed the following Excep-
tion to the Ruling of the Court. 
page 22 ~ A copy of the Exception to the Ruling of the 
Court. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Enoch Wright 
vs. 
Rice M. Youell, ~Superintendent of the State Penitentiary of 
Virginia. 
EXCEPTION TO THE RULING OF THE COURT. 
Now comes counsel for the petitioner and notes the excep-
tion to the ruling of the Court in denying the petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus to Enoch Wright, Counsel for the peti-
54 Supreme Court of Appeals of jVirginia. 
tioner ·bases his exceptions to the ruling of the ~Court to the 
fact that the ruling of the Court is contrary to law and for 
that reason ask leave of Court to file this written exception to 
its ruling thereof. 
page 23 ~ The petitioner, through counsel, tenders this, 
his Certificate of Evidence and prays that it may be 
filed, sealed, and made a part of the record in this case, which 
is accordingly done this 25th day of January, 1933. 
JULIEN GUNN, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
page 24 ~ Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Enoch Wright 
vs. 
Rice ~L Youell, Superi~tendent of the State Penitentiary of 
Virginia. 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS #1. 
Be it remembered ihat on the trial of this case, the peti-
tioner moved the Court to a.llow him his freedom and to dis-
charg·e him from the ·custody of the Superintendent of the 
.State Penitentiary of Virginia, on the ground that he was 
being illegally imprisoned, detained, confined and restrained 
in the State Penitentiary of Virg·inia, contrary to the law of 
the land, which law is hereinafter presented, on the grounds 
that the petitioner is entitled to be credited with the time 
elapsing· betw·een the date of his conditional pardon and the 
date when he 'vas returned to the Penitentiary on account 
of a second conviction, and second, that the petitioner is en-
titled to be credited with the concurrent service of time dur-
ing his second incarceration in the Penitentiary for a second 
conviction which sentence would run concurrently with the 
period of sentence for his first conviction; which motion the 
Court overruled to which action of the Court in so overrul-
ing the said motion, denying the Writ of IIabeas Corpus, the 
petitioner, by counsel, excepted and tenders this, his Bill of 
Exceptions # 1, and prays that it may be signed, sealed and 
made a part of the record in this case, which is accordingly 
done this 25th day of January, 1933. 
JULIEN GUNN, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
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page 25 ~ To the Honorable 1\fajor Gi!bson, 
Attorney General's Office, 
Richmond, Nirginia. 
Dear Sir: 
I herewith tender you copies of the Bills of Exception in 
the case of Enoch Wright vs. Rice M. ·Youell, Superintend-
ent of the .State Penitentiary of Virginia, and notify yon that 
I will present the same to the Judge of the Circuit Court of 
the City of Richmond, for his signature, on the 25th day of 
January, 1933, at 10 o'clock A. M. 
RALPH C. BETHEL, 
Attorney for the Petitioner. 
L·egal and timely service of this notice is hereby accepted. 
EDWIN H. GIBSON, 
Office of the Attorney General of the 
State of Virginia. 
I, Walker Cottrell, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City 
of Richmond, Virginia, herey certify that the foregoing is 
a true copy of the record in the case of Enoch Wright vs. 
Rice M. Youell, !Superintenden of the State Penitentiary of 
Virginia, and I further certify that the notice required by law, 
given to the attorney for the Commonwealth, that application 
'vould be made for a copy of the record in this case. 
Given under my hand this 25th day of January, 1933. 
WALKER COTTRELL, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Richmond, Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste : 
H. STEW ART JONES, C. C. 
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